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INTRODUCTION 
The last 25 years have witnessed a revolutionary change 
in the status of cannabis under American law. Before 1996, 
state and federal law uniformly outlawed its distribution.1 
By contrast, today 36 states allow marijuana to be sold for 
its potential medical use and 15 (along with the District of 
Columbia) also permit its recreational use.2 The federal 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), however, still bans 
the sale of cannabis for any purpose.3 The debate over the 
appropriate status of marijuana begun in the 1960s4 has only 
 
 1. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841; RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD 
II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1999). 
 2. See, e.g., Wayne Hall & Michael Lynskey, Assessing the Public Health 
Impacts of Legalizing Recreational Cannabis Use: The U.S. Experience, 19 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 179, 179-80 (2020); Claire Hansen & Horus Alas, Where Is Marijuana 
Legal? A Guide to Marijuana Legalization, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 13, 
2020, 3:24 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-
marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization; Marijuana: Effects, Medical 
Uses, and Legalization, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/illicit/ 
marijuana.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-
medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (Feb. 19, 2021).  
 3. The Controlled Substances Act was Title II of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904). Title I addressed prevention and 
treatment of narcotics addiction, and Title III dealt with the import and export 
of controlled substances. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 n.19 (2005). A 
“controlled substance” is “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, 
included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this [subchapter],” except for 
“distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or 
used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). The 
Controlled Substances Act incorporates the definition of a “drug” from the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).  
 4. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A 
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972) [hereinafter MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF 
2021] CANNABIS CAPITALISM 217 
accelerated since then and won’t slow down anytime soon.5 
A thorough debate is critical to informed policymaking. 
Unfortunately, however, “cannabis policy has raced ahead of 
cannabis science.”6 For example, much of the past discussion 
about legalization took place at a time when marijuana was 
far less potent than it is today.7 That development is an 
 
MISUNDERSTANDING]; E.R. BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA (1968); MARIJUANA (Erich 
Goode ed., 1969); LESTER GRINSPOON, MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1977); 
JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); HERBERT L. PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 333 (1968) (“A clearer case of 
misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.”); JOHN 
ROSEVEAR, POT: A HANDBOOK OF MARIHUANA (1967); MICHAEL SCHOFIELD, THE 
STRANGE CASE OF POT (1971); THE MARIHUANA PAPERS (David Solomon ed., 1968) 
[hereinafter THE MARIHUANA PAPERS]; Geoffrey Richard Wagner Smith, 
Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of 
Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (1969) (“In the same week that the 
President of the United States declared an all-out war on marijuana smuggling, 
. . . the Wall Street Journal reported discussion in the business world on the profit 
potential in legalized marijuana.”). 
 5. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A. WHITE, GOING TO POT: WHY THE 
RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING AMERICA (2015); ROBERT A. MIKOS, 
MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY (2017); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Marijuana 
Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, 
GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS (Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 
2013, at 1; ROBIN ROOM ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: BEYOND STALEMATE (2010); 
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA (Kevin A. Sabet & Ken C. Winters 
eds., 2018); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015); Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana 
Legalization and Horizontal Federalism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595 (2016); Todd 
Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat 
to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2013). For a summary of the 
competing arguments, compare Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana 
Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99 (2018) (summarizing 
the pro-legalization case), with Kevin Sabet, Marijuana and Legalization 
Impacts, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 84 (2018) (summarizing the anti-legalization 
case). 
 6. Archie Bleyer & Brian Barnes, Comment & Response, Opioid Death Rate 
Acceleration in Jurisdictions Legalizing Marijuana Use, 178 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 1280, 1280 (2018). 
 7. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the THC content of agricultural 
marijuana was approximately only 1-3 percent. Today, that number is far higher, 
reaching 90-plus percent in some cases. See, e.g., KEVIN A. SABET, SMOKESCREEN: 
WHAT THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY DOESN’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 32 (2021); Suman 
Chandra et al., New Trends in Cannabis Potency in USA and Europe During the 
Last Decade (2008-2017), 269 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL 
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important one. As Nora Volkow, Director of the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, has noted, “increase in THC 
content raises concerns that the consequences of marijuana 
use may be worse now than in the past . . . .”8 Beer and grain 
alcohol do not have the same per-ounce “kick,” and the same 
is true of granddaddy’s ganja and today’s weed. Just as no 
one would base alcohol policy on the psychoactive effects of 
only beer or wine to the exclusion of distilled spirits, so, too, 
no one should ignore the current state of scientific knowledge 
regarding contemporary marijuana. That is critical given the 
potentially life-shattering effects that long-term 
consumption of today’s cannabis can have on the labile 
adolescent brain.9 
Yet, scientific issues are not the only ones that need close 
 
NEUROSCIENCES 5 (2019); Wayne Hall & Louisa Degenhardt, 
Editorial, High Potency Cannabis: A Risk Factor for Dependence, Poor 
Psychosocial Outcomes, and Psychosis, 350 BMJ 1205 (2015); infra note 96. See 
generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Bertha K. Madras, Opioids, Overdoses, and 
Cannabis: Is Marijuana an Effective Therapeutic Response to the Opioid Abuse 
Epidemic?, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 573–74, 574 n.71 (2019) (collecting 
authorities). 
 8. Nora D. Volkow et al., Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, 370 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2219, 2222 (2014). That is why she has questioned “the current 
relevance of the findings in older studies on the effects of marijuana use, 
especially studies that assessed long-term outcomes.” Id. 
 9. See, e.g., GEORGE F. KOOB ET AL., DRUGS, ADDICTION, AND THE BRAIN 269, 
279–87 (2014); Alan J. Budney et al., Cannabis, in LOWINSON AND RUIZ’S 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 227 (Pedro Ruiz & Eric Strain eds., 5th ed. 2011); ROOM ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 31–39 (describing studies investigating the risk that adolescent 
marijuana use could adversely affect learning, result in a greater drop-out rate, 
be a prelude to other drug use, or lead to schizophrenia or depression); 
Volkow, supra note 8, at 2219 (“The regular use of marijuana during adolescence 
is of particular concern, since use by this age group is associated with an 
increased likelihood of deleterious consequences.”); id. at 2220 tbl.1.1 (noting that 
altered brain development, poor educational outcome, cognitive impairment, and 
diminished life satisfaction are “strongly associated with initial marijuana use 
early in adolescence”). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Marijuana Edibles and 
“Gummy Bears,” 66 BUFF. L. REV. 313, 324–39, 326 nn.30-63 (2018) [hereinafter 
Larkin, Gummy Bears] (collecting authorities). That is a reason why the 
American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Cancer Society, the American 
Academy of Ophthalmology, the National Institute for Drug Abuse, and others 
have said that minors should not use cannabis. Id. at 327–28, 328 n.31. 
2021] CANNABIS CAPITALISM 219 
scrutiny in this regard.10 Numerous, novel economic, 
business, and regulatory questions arise when a substance 
transitions from contraband to a consumer good.11 Many of 
 
 10. Most of the discussion to date focuses on the practical difficulty (and 
intellectual impossibility) of continuing to allow two entirely different and 
inconsistent regulatory schemes to continue to butt heads over the identical 
subject. There is a clear conflict between federal criminal law and the statutes in 
more than 30 states, which grant people licenses to engage in conduct that federal 
law makes a crime. No one believes that the current state of affairs is a good one, 
but there is no consensus about which solution is optimal. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
Reflexive Federalism, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter 
Larkin, Reflexive Federalism]. The states cannot remedy this problem on their 
own. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution makes federal law 
superior to state law when the two conflict. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Accordingly, states cannot 
exempt their residents from federal law by adopting their own regulatory 
programs. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–33 (2005) (rejecting the 
argument that a state medical marijuana program available only for bona fide 
state residents should be exempt from federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494–95 
(2001) (rejecting a medical necessity defense to federal prosecution in a state with 
a medical marijuana program). Congress could revise the CSA to eliminate the 
ban on cannabis trafficking in states that now permit it, but Congress has refused 
to tackle that issue head on. Instead, Congress has only nibbled around the edges 
of the issue. Since 2014, Congress has regularly passed appropriations bills 
prohibiting the U.S. Department of Justice from halting state medical marijuana 
programs. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering Federal Marijuana Regulation, 18 
OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 99, 108, 108 n.39 (2020) [hereinafter Larkin, Reconsidering 
Marijuana]. 
 11. See, e.g., JEFF CHAPMAN ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FORECASTS HAZY 
FOR STATE MARIJUANA REVENUE (2019); BEN CORT, WEED, INC.: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
THC, THE POT LOBBY, THC, AND THE COMMERCIAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2017); 
DANIELLE DAVENPORT, CANNABIS, INC.: THE JOURNEY FROM COMPASSION TO 
INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION (2019); JOHN GELUARDI, CANNABIZ: THE EXPLOSIVE RISE 
OF THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2010); CHRISTIAN HAGESETH, BIG WEED: 
AN ENTREPRENEUR’S HIGH STAKES ADVENTURES IN THE BUDDING LEGAL MARIJUANA 
BUSINESS (2015); THE POT BOOK: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO CANNABIS (Julie Holland 
ed., 2010); ROSS O’BRIEN, CANNABIS CAPITAL: HOW TO GET YOUR BUSINESS FUNDED 
IN THE CANNABIS ECONOMY (2020); TRISH REGAN, JOINT VENTURES: INSIDE 
AMERICA’S ALMOST LEGAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2011); D.J. SUMMERS, THE 
BUSINESS OF CANNABIS: NEW POLICIES FOR THE NEW MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2018); 
Sam Kamin, What California Can Learn from Colorado’s Marijuana Regulations, 
49 U. PAC. L. REV. 13 (2017) [hereinafter Kamin, Colorado’s Marijuana 
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those issues were not extensively discussed before 1996 
because they would have been entirely academic when 
cannabis was outlawed everywhere and had to be grown, 
sold, possessed, and used in secret. After all, it makes little 
sense to spend much time deciding how to publicly regulate 
the distribution of contraband. Given the revolution in state 
law, however, marijuana no longer has that status in every 
state. Cannabis has become an item of “quasi-legal” 
commerce—quasi-legal because federal law remains 
unchanged, and there is disunity across the states.12 The 
result is a pressing need to consider whether and how to 
regulate cannabis in states with medical or recreational 
marijuana programs.  
What enhances the urgency of the matter is the risk that 
Congress might revise the CSA and allow the states to make 
all regulatory decisions.13 In theory, of course, Congress’s 
decision to allow the states to decide how to regulate an issue 
would be seen as a victory for the principles of federalism. It 
 
Regulations]; John Mixon, Commercializing Cannabis: Confronting the 
Challenges and Uncertainty of Trademark and Trade Secret Protection for 
Cannabis-Related Businesses, 16 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 1 (2020); Luke 
Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015); Thomas Stufano, Through the Smoke: Do 
Current Civil Liability Laws Address the Unique Issues Presented by the 
Recreational Marijuana Industry?, 34 TOURO L. Rev. 1409 (2018); Ryan B. Stoa, 
Marijuana Agricultural Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69 FLA. L. 
REV. 297 (2017); Brandon Mikhail Thompson, The Incredible Edible: Protecting 
Businesses and Consumers in a Society of Legalized Cannabis, 4 NEV. L. J. F. 60 
(2020). 
 12. The rules governing medical and recreational programs vary from state 
to state. See, e.g., THOMAS F. BABOR ET AL., DRUG POLICY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
245-54 (2d ed. 2018); Rosalie L. Pacula et al., Words Can Be Deceiving: A Review 
of Variation among Legally Effective Medical Marijuana Laws in the United 
States, 7 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2014). 
 13. Toward the end of the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives 
passed the Marijuana Opportunity, Reinvestment, and Expungement (MORE) 
Act of 2020, H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), which would have lifted the 
federal ban on distributing marijuana. The Senate did not act on the bill before 
the end of that Congress. Someone likely will reintroduce it in the 117th 
Congress. See also, e.g., Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through 
Entrusting States Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (a bill that would 
amend the CSA to allow the states to decide whether to legalize marijuana). 
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would allow each of the 50 states to “serve as a laboratory” 
and “try novel social and economic experiments” to develop 
different regulatory approaches in an effort to decide which 
one works best “without risk to the rest of the country.”14 The 
reality of the matter, however, could be quite different. As 
Carnegie-Mellon University Professor Jonathan Caulkins, 
an expert on marijuana policy, has admonished us, legalizing 
the for-profit sale of marijuana “is an irreversible leap into 
the unknown” and “would be next to impossible to unwind.”15 
Before the nation commits itself to a potentially irreversible 
course, we should consider whether the current state 
programs—which permit the private, large-scale, 
commercial distribution of cannabis—represent the business 
model that we want to endorse nationwide.16  
That discussion must focus on two unique challenges 
that cannabis poses, ones not raised by most other consumer 
products. Those challenges stem from one of cannabis’ 
 
 14. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). See generally MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE 
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2020) (collecting essays making that argument). 
 15. Jonathan Caulkins, Against a Weed Industry, NAT’L REV., Apr. 2, 2018, at 
27 [hereinafter Caulkins, Weed Industry]. 
 16. A few legal scholars have addressed those issues.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. 
BERMAN & ALEX KREIT, MARIJUANA LAW AND POLICY (2020); Richard J. Bonnie, 
The Surprising Collapse of Marijuana Prohibition: What Now?, Keynote Address 
at the UC Davis Law Review Symposium: Disjointed Regulation: State Efforts to 
Legalize Marijuana (Jan. 29, 2016), in 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573 (2016); Sam 
Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
617, 652 (2016) [hereinafter Kamin, Legal Cannabis]; Robert A. Mikos, 
Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719 (2015). The best policy 
analyses, however, are by non-lawyer cannabis experts, such as Jonathan 
Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, the late Mark Kleiman, and Rosalie Ricardo Pacula. See, 
e.g., Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15; Jonathan P. Caulkins, A Principled 
Approach to Taxing Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Summer 2017, at 22; Jonathan P. 
Caulkins, The Real Dangers of Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Winter 2016, at 21 
[hereinafter Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers]; Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Public-
Health Case for Legalizing Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2019, at 68 
[hereinafter Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health]; Mark A.R. Kleiman, 
Cannabis, Conservatively, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2014, at 28 [hereinafter Kleiman, 
Cannabis Conservatively]. Their analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are 
worth very serious consideration. 
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biologically active constituents (known as cannabinoids)—
Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol or THC, the ingredient responsible 
for marijuana’s well-known euphoric effect.17 THC puts 
marijuana into a small category of consumer products, like 
tobacco and alcohol, because regular use can render 
individuals dependent on the drug. Moreover, like alcohol, 
even occasional use of THC can impair someone’s ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle, which can lead to the grievous 
injury or death of third parties. For both reasons, cannabis 
use creates more misery than joy for some people.18 We 
should not adopt a potentially irreversible course of full 
commercialization before carefully examining the 
consequences. 
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I 
discusses the evolution of cannabis from contraband to 
regulated consumer product. It will summarize how 
marijuana lost its status as kryptonite in contemporary 
America and what the cannabis industry looks like today. 
Part II will discuss state regulation of that industry. Part 
II.A. will discuss how states use the regulatory process to 
address traditional price and quality issues. Part II.B. will 
then examine the two issues mentioned above that arise 
because of the peculiar nature of marijuana: dependency and 
impairment. To address those problems, that Part 
recommends that states should own all retail stores where 
cannabis is sold and should refuse to advertise any aspect of 
its availability, price, and quality themselves. Those steps 
would address the dependency and impairment problems by 
making unlawful purchases far more difficult and legal 
purchases of cannabis only slightly more difficult. Part III 
then speaks to what Congress can do to help the states 
address dependency and impairment. It argues that 
Congress should require a state to adopt both regulatory 
 
 17. LESLIE L. IVERSEN, THE SCIENCE OF MARIJUANA 100–04 (2d ed. 2008). 
 18. See ED GOGEK, MARIJUANA DEBUNKED 140 (2015) (“The nature of all 
addictive drugs is to promise bliss but deliver woe.”). 
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tools as a condition of revising federal law to allow the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana in its jurisdiction. 
Part III also discusses whether the Tenth Amendment 
forbids Congress from putting the states to that choice. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CANNABIS FROM CONTRABAND TO 
CONSUMER PRODUCT 
A. The Legal Evolution 
The plant botanically classified as cannabis, but 
popularly called marijuana, has existed since at least the 
Neolithic Period, when humans began to learn agriculture, 
more than ten thousand years ago.19 Cannabis contains 
numerous biologically active compounds.20 The best-known 
one is THC, which produces a euphoric effect.21 That effect, 
coupled with the argument that the plant has several 
potential medical benefits, has generated a large number of 
 
 19. Swedish botanist Karl Linnaeus labeled it as cannabis sativa in 1753. See, 
e.g., BRIT. MED. ASS’N, THERAPEUTIC USES OF CANNABIS 7 (1997); BRIAN F. THOMAS 
& MAHMOUD A. ELSOHLY, THE ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY OF CANNABIS 1 (2016); 
Sunil K. Aggarwal et al., Medicinal Use of Cannabis in the United States: 
Historical Perspectives, Current Trends, and Future Directions, 5 J. OPIOID MGMT. 
153, 153–57 (2009). 
 20. Cannabis contains more than 100 known cannabinoids and, altogether, 
more than 700 known constituents. There are three categories of cannabinoids. 
Endocannabinoids are innate neurotransmitters produced in the brain or in 
peripheral tissues. Phytocannabinoids are compounds produced by the plants 
Cannabis sativa or Cannabis indica. Synthetic cannabinoids are laboratory-
synthesized compounds that are structurally analogous or similar to 
phytocannabinoids or endocannabinoids, and may act by similar or different 
biological mechanisms. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE HEALTH 
EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 54 tbl.2-2 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. 
REPORT]; Seddon R. Savage et al., Cannabis in Pain Treatment: Clinical and 
Research Considerations, 17 J. PAIN 654, 656 (2016). 
 21. See, e.g., Marijuana Research Report, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE 
[hereinafter NAT’L INST., Marijuana], https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/ 
research-reports/marijuana/what-are-marijuana-effects (July 2020) (“Many 
people experience a pleasant euphoria and sense of relaxation. Other common 
effects, which may vary dramatically among different people, include heightened 
sensory perception (e.g., brighter colors), laughter, altered perception of time, and 
increased appetite.”). 
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cannabis use advocates.22 At the same time, cannabis use can 
have harmful effects on users and third parties.23 For 
example, heavy or long-term cannabis users can become 
dependent on the drug.24 THC also impairs one’s ability to 
handle a motor vehicle safely, with the result that driving 
under the influence of cannabis has become a major public 
health problem.25 The debate whether cannabis’ harms 
outweigh its benefits has generated considerable social, 
political, and legal controversy for the last 60 years.26  
 
 22. See, e.g., Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and 
Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 102 (2018). Potential therapeutic uses of 
cannabis include pain relief, treatment of chemotherapy-induced nausea and 
emesis, the neuropathic pain and spasticity caused by multiple sclerosis, and 
AIDS-induced cachexia. See, e.g., BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 19, 
at 21–49; WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANNABIS: A HEALTH PERSPECTIVE AND RESEARCH 
AGENDA (1997); NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 20, at 54 tbl.2-2, 128 box 4-1 
(listing conditions for which marijuana is a treatment for which there are varying 
degrees of scientific support); Gemayel Lee et al., Medical Cannabis for 
Neuropathic Pain, 22 CURRENT PAIN & HEADACHE REPS. 8 (2018) (“Nearly 20 
years of clinical data supports the short-term use of cannabis for the treatment 
of neuropathic pain.”). See generally Larkin & Madras, supra note 7, at 566–71 
(collecting studies arguing that cannabis has analgesic properties).  
 23. See, e.g., Sabet, supra note 5, at 86. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 111–37.  
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 138–44.  
 26. In addition to the publications cited elsewhere in this Article, see, for 
example, INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 
218 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter INST. OF MED.]; OFF. OF NAT’L 
DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, MARIJUANA MYTHS AND FACTS: THE TRUTH BEHIND 10 
POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS (2004); MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 4; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 22; SEAN BEIENBURG, PROHIBITION, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATES’ RIGHTS (2019); WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A. 
WHITE, GOING TO POT: WHY THE RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING 
AMERICA (2015); MITCH EARLEYWINE, UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA: A NEW LOOK 
AT THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2002); TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA 
(2014); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); MARK A.R. 
KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL (1989); Magdalena 
Cerdá et al., Medical Marijuana Laws in 50 States: Investigating the Relationship 
Between State Legalization of Medical Marijuana and Marijuana Use, Abuse and 
Dependence, 120 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 22 (2012); Wayne Hall, What 
Has Research Over the Past Two Decades Revealed About the Adverse Health 
Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19 (2014); Alex Kreit, 
Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their 
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By comparison, until recently the number of economic, 
commercial, or regulatory issues generated by cannabis has 
been relatively small. The reason is that for most of the last 
century, federal and state law have uniformly treated 
marijuana as contraband, a substance that was illegal to 
grow, sell, or possess for any purpose.27 As a result, there was 
no need to decide how to regulate a commercial marijuana 
market, since there can be no lawful sale of an item that the 
criminal code outlaws. 
Starting in the 1960s, however, cannabis use became an 
alternative to alcohol as a source of relaxation for Baby 
Boomers and a potent political symbol of a generation 
rebelling against the status quo.28 There was a serious 
discussion whether to revise federal and state law to treat 
cannabis like alcohol and tobacco, also dangerous products 
that nonetheless can be sold under government regulation.29 
Neither Congress nor the state legislatures completely 
restructured their approach to marijuana, although some 
localities effectively “decriminalized” its possession in small 
quantities by treating it as a minor infraction similar to a 
traffic or moving violation punishable only by a small fine. 
Marijuana trafficking, however, remained a serious crime 
under federal and state law.  
In 1996, that uniformity disappeared. California voters 
 
Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (2003). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
Introduction to a Debate: “Marijuana: Legalize, Decriminalize, or Leave the 
Status Quo in Place?,” 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 73 (2018) (summarizing 
arguments pro and con). That output will continue because of the differences 
between federal and state law, as discussed below. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo 
Pacula & Eric L. Sevigny, Marijuana Liberalization Policies: Why We Can’t Learn 
Much from Policy Still in Motion, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 212 (2014).  
 27. See supra note 1. 
 28. See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 2–3). 
 29. See, e.g., MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 4; 
BLOOMQUIST, supra note 4; MARIJUANA, supra note 4; GRINSPOON, supra note 4; 
KAPLAN, supra note 26; PACKER, supra note 4, at 333 (“A clearer case of 
misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.”); 
ROSEVEAR, supra note 4; SCHOFIELD, supra note 4; THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra 
note 4.  
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enacted a statewide initiative—Proposition 215, also called 
the Compassionate Use Act—that became the nation’s first 
state-law based “medical marijuana” program.30 The 
initiative authorized cannabis to be grown, sold, and used in 
California to treat various medical conditions.31 Since then, 
more than 30 other states have followed suit with their own 
medical-use regulatory schemes.32 Atop that, more than a 
dozen states, including California, have gone a step further 
by allowing cannabis to be sold for purely recreational use—
that is, merely to obtain the euphoric effect that THC 
produces.33 States in that category regulate marijuana in 
much the same way that they treat cigarettes and alcohol.  
The result is this: With respect to the legality of 
cannabis, to borrow from Cicero, we have one law for Athens 
and one for Rome. More than 60 percent of the states have 
turned what once was only a black market operation into an 
open, quasi-legitimate field of business. To be sure, 
marijuana distribution is still a crime under the federal 
CSA.34 But the U.S. Department of Justice has gone back and 
forth on whether, when, and how to enforce the CSA,35 and 
 
 30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2021). 
 31. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 106. 
 32. See supra note 4. 
 33. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 106. 
 34. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904). A “controlled substance” is “a drug or 
other substance, or immediate precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V 
of part B of this subchapter,” except for “distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, 
or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). The Controlled Substances Act 
incorporates the definition of a “drug” from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
 35. The Obama Administration Justice Department issued memoranda 
adopting enforcement guidelines that attempted to afford the banking industry 
some relief from its fear of dealing with businesses in the cannabis industry. The 
federal courts had an opportunity to offer some clarification of this matter in 
Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 861 F.3d 
1052 (10th Cir. 2017), but could not reach agreement. By a 2-1 vote but without 
a majority opinion, the court’s per curiam opinion dismissed without prejudice a 
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Congress has treated the inconsistency between federal and 
state law as if it were the plague, something to be avoided at 
all cost.36 As far as marijuana enforcement is concerned, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration has essentially been 
relegated to the sidelines for an indefinite period. 
Where does that leave us? The states have the ball when 
it comes to setting cannabis policy, and they have generally 
decided to allow private enterprises to control the means of 
production and sale, albeit under different types and degrees 
of state regulation. Complicating the regulatory framework 
are differences among states as to the type and amount of 
local regulation that counties and cities may impose atop 
state rules.37 The next part will summarize what the 
cannabis business looks like today. 
  
 
credit union’s suit against the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to be permitted to serve 
the cannabis industry. Each member of the three-judge panel majority gave a 
different reason for the court’s order, so the ruling effectively offers no guidance 
on the banking issues. In any event, in January 2018 U.S. Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions rescinded the earlier Justice Department memoranda. See Larkin, 
Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 6–7, 6 n.31). Accordingly, 
banks are back to square one—viz., they are again at risk of criminal liability for 
offering their services to the marijuana industry. In 2019, the House of 
Representatives passed the Secure and Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2019 
(the SAFE Banking Act of 2019), H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019), which would 
allow financial institutions to service marijuana businesses in states where the 
substance is lawful. See H.R. Rep. No. 116-104, pt. 1 (2019). The Senate did not 
act on the House bill in the 116th Congress. 
 36. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 108. 
 37. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 720 (“[S]tates are now facing growing 
opposition from within their own borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s 
perceived harms, many local communities in marijuana legalization states are 
seeking to reinstate marijuana prohibitions at the local level. Communities in at 
least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local bans on 
marijuana dispensaries. Even in Colorado, arguably the state with the most 
liberal marijuana policies, more than 150 municipalities have passed ordinances 
banning the commercial sale of marijuana. And countless other communities that 
otherwise welcome or at least tolerate the marijuana industry are nonetheless 
attempting to regulate it, imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the 
location, size, hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local 
vendors.” (footnote omitted)). 
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B. The Contemporary Cannabis Business 
The discord between federal and state law (or, in some 
cases, between state and local law) has an effect beyond 
cannabis growers and sellers. Like any industry, businesses 
need assistance from other companies for a host of ancillary 
services. As a result, the states’ decisions to legalize the 
commercial sale of marijuana under their own laws has 
created not only a cannabis industry, but also a support 
industry that also operates in a gray zone between lawful 
and illegal enterprises because that industry assists 
cannabis growers and sellers.38 Every company that does 
business with the cannabis industry, even ones that supply 
only electricity or water, is in that zone and, to some degree, 
is at risk of being charged with aiding and abetting criminal 
activity, even though they would otherwise never be 
characterized as furthering the commission of a crime. 
Clarification of the law would help the owners, officers, and 
employees of such companies to know whether they are at 
risk of federal criminal liability for selling their products or 
offering their services to state-legal businesses. 
For example, the people who own the facilities necessary 
to grow, package, transport, or distribute cannabis—
colloquially known as “ganjapreneurs”—hire employees or 
use independent contractors for different responsibilities, 
such as in-store sales.39 In some instances, the cannabis 
industry has merely increased the need for already existing 
services—such as web design, app creation, marketing, 
transportation, and delivery—that any firm producing a new 
 
 38. Compare, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1940) 
(ruling that a party who furnishes innocuous supplies (sugar, cans, etc.) to an 
illicit distiller is not guilty of conspiracy “even though his sale may have furthered 
the object of a conspiracy to which the distiller was a party but of which the 
supplier had no knowledge”), with, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 
U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (distinguishing the “articles of normal trade” in Falcone from 
the sale of “narcotic drugs” and other “restricted commodities” that have an 
“inherent capacity for harm”). 
 39. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 34–49; GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 2. 
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consumer product must use.40 Some retailers combine the 
sale of marijuana with other products, opening (for instance) 
coffee shops that also sell cannabis.41  
State regulatory programs might create a need for allied 
enterprises focused specifically on the cannabis industry.42 
Some programs require cannabis to be tracked from “seed to 
sale,” which has led tech companies to create tracking badges 
and software so that companies can prove that they are not 
black marketeers.43 Some state regulators require that 
companies have insurance. Since not every well-known 
insurance company is willing to sell coverage to firms that 
break federal law on an ongoing basis, new firms have arisen 
to take advantage of this opportunity.44 Regulation can also 
include a requirement to test batches for toxins, pesticides, 
solvents, and other contaminants, which lead some 
 
 40. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 108; Jelena Milenkovic, Dosing CBD Oil 
with Droppy Calculator App, LEGAL READER (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.legalreader.com/dosing-cbd-oil-with-droppy-calculator-app/. Home 
delivery is a problem for cannabis retailers. The U.S. Postal Service, United 
Parcel Service, and FedEx won’t deliver marijuana, and companies like Amazon 
have to date steered clear of entering that service line. See SUMMERS, supra note 
11, at 66. Retailers are essentially limited to brick-and-mortar stores with “carry 
out” service or local delivery companies. Id. 
 41. See REGAN, supra note 11, at 41. 
 42. Such as books, magazines, and websites focused on cannabis business 
issues. See, e.g., ALYSON MARTIN & NUSHIN RASHIDIAN, A NEW LEAF: THE END OF 
CANNABIS PROHIBITION 120–21 (2014); ED ROSENTHAL, MARIJUANA GROWERS 
HANDBOOK (2010); MARIJUANA VENTURE: THE JOURNAL OF PROFESSIONAL 
CANNABIS GROWERS AND RETAILERS, https://www.marijuanaventure.com (last 
visited June 5, 2020); cf. ANDREA DRUMMER, CANNABIS CUISINE: BUD PAIRINGS OF 
A BORN AGAIN CHEF (2017). 
 43. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 120; Davide Fortin, Cannabis 
Cannibalization: Is the Recreational Market Appealing to Patients in Colorado? 
(Nov. 2015) (M.Sc. thesis, Copenhagen Business School) (ResearchGate) 
(describing Colorado’s tracking program). There might be some slippage, 
however, in some of the tracking systems. See Chris Halsne, Missing Marijuana: 
Weed Disappearing from Licensed Dispensaries, Not All Cheaters Get Caught 
FOX31 (May 1, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://kdvr.com/news/problem-solvers/missing-
marijuana-weed-disappearing-from-licensed-dispensaries-not-all-cheaters-get-
caught/. 
 44. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 121–24.   
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entrepreneurs to create cannabis-testing labs.45 State and 
local packaging and labeling requirements—for example, 
rules demanding that bags be child resistant, resealable, and 
opaque—have led to the creation of companies to fill 
retailers’ need.46 Finally, entrepreneurs in states with 
recreational-use marijuana laws have created “cannabis 
tourism” businesses for people who want to “live on the edge” 
for a few days or just smoke some dope.47 
Companies in this industry also have the same general 
need for lawyers, accountants, public relations advisors, 
political consultants, policy advocates, lobbyists, and ballot 
organizers that every other firm in a regulated industry must 
use whether to learn or change the law, obtain a license, or 
satisfy complex state and local rules.48 Navigating the line 
 
 45. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:4-105 to 212-3:4-135 (2020); 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 61-63; Anna L. Schwabe & Mitchell E. McGlaughlin, 
Genetic Tools Weed Out Misconceptions of Strain Reliability in Cannabis Sativa: 
Implications for a Budding Industry, 1 J. CANNABIS RSCH. 14 (2019) (“strain 
inconsistency is evident and is not limited to a single source, but rather exists 
among dispensaries across cities in multiple states”). 
 46. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:3-1005 to 212-3:3-1020 (2020); 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 124-25; Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal 
Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 11 (2020); Julie 
Weed, Two Retirees Create Marijuana Packaging Business in Colorado, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/business/small 
business/cannabis-pot-entrepreneurs-marijuana-colorado.html?searchResult 
Position=34. 
 47. See, e.g., Susan G. Hauser, Cannabis Tourism Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/travel/marijuana-vacation-
travel-cannabis-usa.html?searchResultPosition=10. 
 48. See MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 121 (noting the emergence of 
an organization, the National Cannabis Industry Association, and a law firm, 
Vincente Sederberg LLC, to serve the cannabis industry); GELUARDI, supra note 
11, at 124; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 25 (“Licensing is so complex and laborious 
that many cannabis businesses devote themselves to it.”); id. at 29 (“An American 
business deals in laws and regulations along with buying for a dime and selling 
for a dollar.  Cannabis does so much more because of the federal/state gap. This 
lends a unique flavor to the cannabis industry—whether advocates, lobbyists, 
prosecutors, regulators, business advisors, or criminal defense specialists—
everything cannabis related starts moving with, moves through, moves around, 
is moved by, and stops with lawyers.”); id. at 102–03; Patricia E. Salkin & 
Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and 
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between quasi-legitimate business and drug dealing is tricky 
and requires legal guidance49 and political allies.50 In fact, 
given the odd state of their business under federal and state 
law, their need might even be greater than that of a company 
 
Smoke That Here?, PLAN. & ENV’T L., Aug. 2010, at 3, 3–8 [hereinafter Salkin & 
Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning] (describing various municipal location 
restrictions, licensing processes, and operational and promotional rules). Not 
surprisingly, some former state regulators have switched over to the private 
sector to serve as consultants to states with their own new marijuana programs. 
See J.B. Logan, For This Guy, States Are His Biggest Customers, in LEGAL 
MARIJUANA: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC BENEFITS, RISKS AND POLICY APPROACHES 
64, 64–69 (Joaquin Jay Gonzalez III & Mickey P. McGee eds., 2019) (describing 
the “technocratic expertise” that Andrew Freedman, former Colorado “state 
marijuana czar,” and Lewis Koski, former Colorado Department of Revenue 
Director of Marijuana Enforcement and one of Freedman’s partners, offer states 
building out their own cannabis programs).   
 49. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 46 (“As most industry leaders point out, 
the cannabis industry is not just risky, but complex for a garden-variety 
businessman. One prominent cannabis business attorney describes the 
Controlled Substances Act as the Lawyer’s Full Employment Act because of the 
sheer volume of restrictions, the federal/state gap, and the countless snags from 
cannabis business bans and moratoriums. In short, the legal complexity of the 
cannabis industry almost forces entrepreneurs to work with attorneys.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 50. Companies in the cannabis industry have some allies to help them 
negotiate their way through the political maze. Members of the cannabis industry 
rely on the policy, lobbying, and public relations assistance of private 
organizations devoted to their cause, as well as the financial support that certain 
wealthy philanthropists provide them. For example, there are the “four horsemen 
of cannabis”: the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (or 
NORML), the Drug Policy Alliance, the Marijuana Policy Project, and the 
National Cannabis Industry Association. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 34–41. They 
hold ideological views supportive of marijuana legalization and seek (among 
other things) to create a favorable intellectual, social, and political climate for 
medical and recreational marijuana use. Id. Ideological allies also seek to 
dissuade the public from holding negative images of drug use and convince people 
that the “drug war” cure is worse than the disease. One such organization is the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). While not focused on cannabis 
legalization, the ACLU serves as “a well spring of cannabis legalization 
arguments.” Id. at 33. Individuals such as hedge fund manager George Soros and 
Progressive Insurance founder Peter Lewis were some of the largest funders for 
the early cannabis initiatives. Id. Not surprisingly, there are organizations, such 
as Smart Approaches to Marijuana, and wealthy individuals, such as the recently 
deceased Sheldon Adelson, along with private pro-law enforcement 
organizations, who oppose cannabis legalization and contribute their ideas, time, 
and money to those efforts. Id. at 41–46.  
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manufacturing and selling a consumer product that is lawful 
everywhere.51 For example, local zoning rules can limit the 
available business locations, thereby making it expensive to 
purchase or rent storefront property for their peculiar 
business.52 If the success to any business is “location, 
 
 51. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Legal Advice for Marijuana Business 
Entities, in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 155–69. As one journalist 
colorfully put it:  
The only thing separating legal pot from drug war pot is a state-issued 
license, the magical portal through which a black marketer can dance to 
become a media-anointed entrepreneur in exchange for licensing fees, 
taxes, and agreeing to play by certain rules, called regulations. 
The growing, selling, and testing of cannabis are the market’s 
gatekeepers and state governments’ insurance policy against the feds. 
The federal government’s Cole Memo made it clear that states’ rights 
only exist for the states that make sure the black market isn’t involved.  
To make sure the new industry doesn’t invoke an army of DEA agents 
and IRS auditors, state licensing programs make sure [that] no buds get 
packed in pipes, no oils get vaped, no brownies get eaten without a chain 
of licensed farmers, retailers, and testers keeping the cannabis supply 
in traceably legal sources only. 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 55–56. 
 52. See, e.g., HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 54-55; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 
80-81; Kyle A. Harvey, Even Marijuana Needs a Zone: Utah’s H.B. 3001 as the 
Next Battleground for Zoning Ordinances and State Medical Marijuana Laws, 34 
BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 49–50 (2020); Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado 
and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 147, 162 (2012); Ian Morrison, Comment, Where to Put It? The Confusing 
Question of How to Deal with Marijuana Dispensaries, 3 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 
79, 84–85 (2013); Jeremy Nemeth & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana: The 
Cannabis Conundrum, 80 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 1 (2014); Patricia E. Salkin & 
Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoned Out: Local Regulation Meets State 
Acceptance and Federal Quiet Acquiescence, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 295 (2011) 
[hereinafter Salkin & Kansler, Local Regulation]; Salkin & Kansler, Medical 
Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at 3–8. Compare, e.g., City of Riverside v. 
Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 506 (Cal. 
2013) (rejecting argument that state medical marijuana laws bar localities from 
banning or regulating retail cannabis distribution), with, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of 
Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Mich. 2014) (accepting same argument). For 
example, some localities treat retail marijuana facilities as a “nuisance” because 
cannabis distribution is illegal under federal law. Others limit retail facilities to 
business, commercial, or industrial zones or impose various other restrictions, 
such as limiting the number of retail facilities or requiring that facilities be a 
particular distance from schools. See Salkin & Kansler, Local Regulation, supra, 
at 301–19; Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at 3–5. 
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location, location,” cannabis retailers need the help of real 
estate specialists to find an affordable location that is 
accessible to clients, but distant from schools and tolerable 
to their neighbors.53 
In other cases, the quasi-legalized cannabis industry has 
generated the growth of businesses that previously existed 
only in the shadows.54 Hydroponic supply stores, 
construction companies specializing in building “grow 
rooms,” and trade schools teaching the mechanics of 
operating a cannabis business are just a few examples.55 
Marijuana “brokers” (“dealers” has become passé) bridge 
growers and retailers or auction cannabis at a “pot 
 
 53. See, e.g., Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at 
3–4 (noting that some municipalities prohibit dispensaries within a particular 
distance of a school, church, child care facility, park, playground, drug or alcohol 
rehabilitation facility, halfway house, residential area, or other dispensaries); 
Beth DeCarbo, Homeowners Raise a Stink Over Pot-Smoking Neighbors, WALL 
ST. J. (May 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/homeowners-raise-a-
stink-over-pot-smoking-neighbors-11588852854?mod=searchresults&page=1& 
pos=7; Zusha Elinson, Fights Over Where to Grow Marijuana Cause Stink in 
California, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/fights-over-where-to-grow-marijuana-cause-stink-in-california-
11568301226?mod=searchresults&page=6&pos=13. Some landlords, however, 
see cannabis growers and processors as good for their bottom line. See Esther 
Fung, Essential Marijuana Sellers Are a Good Business for Their Landlords, 
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/essential-
marijuana-sellers-are-a-good-business-for-their-landlords-11591099202?cx_test 
Id=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=1#cxrecs_s. In fact, during the 2020 
COVID-19 pandemic, “More than 20 states have designated the cannabis 
industry to be essential, allowing medical marijuana dispensaries, and in some 
cases recreational facilities, to stay open during shelter-in-place orders.” Id.  
 54. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiv (“Illegal for nearly a century, 
legalization is dropping cannabis into something that will turn a formerly 
countercultural icon into commerce as usual. More than 80 years of prohibition 
means cannabis missed out on technological and industrial advances that would 
have given consumers more choice. With nearly every other agricultural product, 
consumers have a variety of value-added products—potatoes become Lays, corn 
becomes Maker’s Mark, yucca is processed to make aloe-packed skin care 
products. With cannabis, consumer demand in the regulated market is only 
starting to produce value-added products.”). 
 55. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 106–08 (noting the birth of an insurance 
company offering protection against “theft, spoilage, and equipment 
breakdown”). 
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clearinghouse.”56  
The industry also needs certain services that result from 
the fact that trafficking is still illegal under federal law. 
Growers and retailers57 cannot use the federal banking 
system and the facilities of interstate finance to raise capital 
through initial public offerings,58 to accept online orders, to 
make bank deposits, or to start employee retirement plans.59 
 
 56. REGAN, supra note 11, at 65–66. 
 57. There is a difference between companies that are in some way related to 
the cannabis business and companies that cultivate and sell smokable or edible 
cannabis. “The NASDAQ exchange lists several publicly traded cannabis 
companies, but the companies are mostly involved in industrial production rather 
than retail or grow operations. Indeed, the publicly traded companies associated 
with cannabis have more ties to the pharmaceutical industry than cannabis 
production and distribution.” SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 78. Among those 
companies, for example, is GW Pharmaceuticals, a United Kingdom-based 
biotech company with a cannabis-based epilepsy drug. Id. Those companies have 
only an “ancillary” connection to cannabis. “They focus on packaging, hydroponic 
gear, business and legal consulting, distribution, etc.” They also have an 
established track record in non-cannabis business. Id. at 79. 
 58. If they could, smaller businesses, particularly ones in a region where a 
statute or regulation limits the number of retail stores, might expand their 
operations considerably. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, Do We Really Want a 
Microsoft of Marijuana?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/08/31/opinion/sunday/marijuana-legal-states-federal.html?searchResult 
Position=22. 
 59. Julie Anderson Hill, Banks and the Marijuana Industry, in MARIJUANA 
FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 139–54. Because banks cannot lend start-up 
businesses money, private venture capital firms and others have stepped into the 
breach. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 71–82; Ciara Linnane, Cannabis 
Company Acreage Enters Funding Agreements for up to $60 Million, 
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2020, 7:55 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
cannabis-company-acreage-enters-funding-agreements-for-up-to-60-million-
2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=6 (noting that an 
American cannabis company raised $60 million via two funding arrangements, 
one with “an unnamed institutional investor,” the other through “a private 
placement”); Heather Mack, Snoop Dogg-Backed Startup Offering Loans to 
Cannabis Companies, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2019, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/snoop-dogg-backed-startup-offering-loans-to-
cannabis-companies-11571783193?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=19; 
Heather Mack, Cannabis Startup Raises $100 Million With Eyes on Expansion, 
Wall St. J. (June 28, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-
startup-raises-100-million-with-eyes-on-expansion-11561735833?mod=search 
results&page=8&pos=2; Vipal Monga et al., Marijuana’s Money Man, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 20, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/marijuanas-money-
2021] CANNABIS CAPITALISM 235 
National banks cannot offer those services to firms that grow 
or sell cannabis in retail outlets without violating the federal 
controlled substances and money laundering statutes.60 
Unable to take advantage of those payment mechanisms, 
firms in the cannabis industry initially operated on a strictly 
cash basis (but now have found some work-arounds, such as 
debit cards).61 Consequently, stores loaded with currency or 
an easily sellable commodity need to use armed private 
security services to deter robberies or burglaries (not always 
successfully62), as well as to transport and store large 
quantities of cash.63 
 
man-11576869335?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=13.  
 60. See HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 75–84; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 76–
78. Some small, local, state-chartered banks have taken the criminal liability 
risks associated with accepting deposits. See id. at 72; see also Tom Angell, More 
Banks Working with Marijuana Businesses, Despite Federal Moves, FORBES (June 
14, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/06/14/more-
banks-working-with-marijuana-businesses-despite-federal-
moves/#3b508e6f1b1b; Caldwell, supra note 58. 
 61. Cannabis companies have also resorted to using “Bitcoin,” a 
cryptocurrency, or “Potcoin,” a cryptocurrency geared to cannabis. SUMMERS, 
supra note 11, at 80. At one time, retailers had to operate on a “cash only” basis 
because they could not allow parties to make purchases via credit cards, but debit 
cards have largely resolved that issue. Conversation with Garth Van Meter, 
former Director of Legislative Affairs, Smart Approaches to Marijuana (June 26, 
2020). 
 62. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 82 (“According to a report prepared by 
LAPD narcotics detective Dennis Packer, numerous dispensaries had been 
robbed despite elaborate security precautions. In fact, the report claimed, some 
dispensaries hired gang members with long criminal histories as security 
guards.”); id. at 84–85 (describing a dispensary robbery and murder); HAGESETH, 
supra note 11, at 94–97; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 65–66, 116–18; Gordon 
Oliver, Where Will Legal Marijuana Industry STASH Its CASH?, in LEGAL 
MARIJUANA, supra note 48, at 56, 57 (“‘It’s no secret that people in the medical 
marijuana field have been robbed quite often,’ said Scott Jarvis, director of 
Washington’s Department of Financial Institutions.”); Sophie Quinton, Why 
Legal Marijuana Businesses Are Still Cash Only, in LEGAL MARIJUANA, supra 
note 48, at 61 (“Since Colorado fully legalized marijuana in January 2014, the 
Denver Police Department has logged over 200 burglaries at marijuana 
businesses, as well as shop lifting and other crimes.”). 
 63. Struggling cannabis businesses cannot take advantage of the federal 
bankruptcy laws to stay afloat or reorganize, a problem that has arisen due to 
the 2020 pandemic-caused recession. See, e.g., Jonathan Randles, Justice 
Department Blocks ‘Essential’ Marijuana Workers from Bankruptcy Protection, 
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What might surprise members of the ancien régime are 
three features of the contemporary cannabis industry. One is 
that, according to several commentators, the “counterculture 
pioneers, outlaws, and rebels of a generation ago” no longer 
are the face of the cannabis industry.64 “Young 
entrepreneurs with newly minted business degrees” are 
running the show.65 The people running companies in the 
cannabis industry far more closely resemble recent 2020 
MBA graduates than members of the 1950s Beat Generation 
or 1960s Hippies.66 
Related to that fact is another one. Large businesses 
likely will replace the backyard growing enterprises that 
(along with smugglers) supplied the pre-1996 demand for 
marijuana.67 Corporate growers, producers, and distributors, 
 
WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2020, 3:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-
department-blocks-essential-marijuana-workers-from-bankruptcy-protection-
11590694160?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4; Jonathan Randles, U.S. Says 
Employee at Cannabis Staffing Agency Can’t Use Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
30, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-employee-at-cannabis-
staffing-agency-cant-use-bankruptcy-11556648808; Jonathan Randles, 
Randles’s Take: Justice Department Just Says No to Marijuana Businesses 




 64. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 5. 
 65. Id. at 4–5. 
 66. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 34 (“These guys don’t wear tie dye and 
carry clipboards. They are lobbyists and privileged white guys (seriously, they 
are all white and rich) in $5,000 suits carrying smartphones and being followed 
by personal assistants. They drive Mercedes not Subarus and have more money 
. . . than you and I will ever see in our lives, all stored up for one reason: to get 
you to consume, and keep consuming, THC.”); GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 96 (“[A] 
new generation of professionals was flocking to the medical marijuana industry 
from successful careers in science, corporate America, and the ministry. By 
taking prominent jobs as lobbyists, managers, teachers, and nonprofit 
fundraisers, they were helping to mainstream the industry’s image.”); id. at 105 
(noting that “the business side of the cannabis industry was making the 
transition from a social movement to a commercial enterprise”); HAGESETH, supra 
note 11, at 43–44. 
 67. Indeed, if Congress were to legalize marijuana distribution, the tobacco 
companies and other large-scale entities might expand their product lines. See, 
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particularly ones that operate in multiple states, can achieve 
economies of scale unattainable by simple “mom and pop” 
operations,68 and they can afford both the experts necessary 
to grow a commercially competitive product69 and the 
phalanx of lawyers, accountants, lobbyists, and the like 
necessary to maintain (and expand) their quasi-legal status 
 
e.g., HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 8, 182; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 135–36; 
Alexander Gladstone, Why One of the World’s Largest Tobacco Companies Is 
Struggling, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2020, 6:02 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-one-of-the-worlds-largest-tobacco-companies-
is-struggling-11582068998?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=9; Vipal Monga, 
Legal Pot Sales Are Off to Slow Start in Canada, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2019, 8:00 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-pot-sales-are-off-to-slow-start-in-
canada-11555156800?mod=article_inline (“Canada is the first Group of Seven 
country to embrace legalization, joining 10 states in the U.S., although cannabis 
is still banned under U.S. federal law. Its move has promoted several big U.S. 
brands like Marlboro maker Altria Group Inc. and brewers like Constellation 
Brands Inc. to invest in Canadian growers.”); Carol Ryan, Weed Versus Greed on 
Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2019, 2:14 PM) [hereinafter Ryan, Weed Versus 
Greed], https://www.wsj.com/articles/weed-versus-greed-on-wall-street-1154841 
2203?mod=article_inline (“Marlboro cigarette maker Altria last month 
announced a $1.8 billion investment in a grower following an almost $4 billion 
bet by Corona brewer Constellation Brands in August. Executives at Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi have said publicly they are closely watching how the business 
develops.”). 
 68. See, e.g., DAVENPORT, supra note 11, at 173–94; HAGESETH, supra note 11, 
at 46 (according to one industry member, “the key to success in this business was 
growing the marijuana”); REGAN, supra note 11, at 69 (posing “one of the big open 
questions about the future of cannabis: will big commercial grows push out small 
artisans . . . ? Will legalization bring with it an industry like most agricultural 
products, with small farmers crushed by huge factory farms, or like the market 
for alcohol, which mixes high-end specialty brewers with international 
conglomerates?”); Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 181; Carol Ryan, Cannabis 
Investors Are Zoning Out About Supply, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2019, 5:11 AM) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Cannabis Supply], https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-
investors-are-zoning-out-about-supply-11561626711?mod=searchresults&page 
=8&pos=3 (“The current need to cultivate cannabis in individual states to serve 
the local market is highly inefficient. Producers with operations in multiple 
states would be able to consolidate in regions with the consistently sunny 
conditions that the cannabis plant likes.”). 
 69. See JOHN HUDAK, MARIJUANA: A SHORT HISTORY 12 (2d ed. 2020) 
(“Although cannabis can grow under a variety of conditions, if a grower wishes to 
maximize a plant’s productivity and ensure that its chemical composition is 
consistent and true to its strain (an important aspect of cannabis grown 
commercially for the production of marijuana), success requires research, care, 
frequent attention, and horticultural and agricultural know-how.”). 
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under state law while fending off the federal Leviathan from 
snuffing out the industry.70 Descheduling, rescheduling, or 
outright legalization of marijuana would greatly alter the 
commercial aspects of the industry.71 
The third fact is the enormous variety of cannabis strains 
and THC-infused products available for sale today.72 
Cannabis “came of age,” so to speak, in the 1960s as a symbol 
of an intergenerational protest. The image of someone in his 
or her 20s or 30s smoking a joint could well serve as a 
representation of that generation’s attitudes toward then-
contemporary social and political culture. Users can still 
smoke cannabis as a “joint” (botanical marijuana in 
 
 70. See CORT, supra note 11, at 30–31, 34–36, 132–33; SUMMERS, supra note 
11, at 56 (“On purpose or by accident, the regulations also tend to make the 
cannabis industry very hard on Mom and Pop. Combined with the larger 
problems of the federal/state gap, licensure and regulations have a way of choking 
out smaller players who can’t keep up with the expense of regulation, leading, as 
in other businesses, to more and more businesses buying out, vertically 
integrating, and franchising to give cannabis its own class of top dogs. Across the 
nation, the top dogs’ rules get spread out.”); id. at 69 (“The industry has gotten 
more consolidated as it developed. In Colorado, 20 percent of the cannabis 
business licenses are owned by only 10 people, most of whom secured their 
franchises by buying out smaller companies.” (footnote omitted)). Five companies 
dominate the cannabis market in Canada, which legalized recreational-use 
marijuana in 2019. See Jacquie McNish & Vipal Monga, Wall Street’s Marijuana 
Madness: ‘It’s Like the Internet in 1997,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-marijuana-madness-its-like-the-
internet-in-1997-1537718400?mod=article_inline (“There are more than 120 
marijuana companies listed on Canadian stock exchanges, but the sector is 
dominated by five companies, whose total market value has catapulted from less 
than $4 billion to nearly $40 billion in the past year.”). Of course, just as 
Budweiser’s dominant position has not prevented the rise of microbreweries, so 
too might small, boutique cannabis stores avoid being absorbed or underpriced 
by larger companies. See HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 205.  
 71. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 140 (“Federal legalization would open 
opportunities to the average businessperson and to the most massive banking 
systems alike. Entrepreneurs could find loans easily. Companies could go public 
and move product across state lines. Big Cannabis would happen.”). 
 72. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 31; HUDAK, supra note 69, at 12–13 (“[A]n 
entire cottage industry has emerged around marijuana genetics, which involves 
the cross-pollination or cross-breeding of different strains and even different 
species of cannabis to produce new hybrid strains.”); Larkin, Gummy Bears, 
supra note 9, at 318–20 (discussing the variety of edible THC-infused products). 
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wrapping paper) or a “blunt” (botanical marijuana wrapped 
in tobacco), by using a “bong” (a pipe or water pipe), or by 
vaporizing THC via an Electronic Nicotine Delivery Device 
(ENDD or e-cigarette).73 Yet, today numerous food products, 
known as “edibles,” also contain THC.74 In addition to the 
Alice B. Toklas brownies popular in the 1960s, numerous 
food products—such as coffee, tea, soda, cookies, candies, 
caramels, lozenges, salad dressing, marinara sauce, and 
others—contain THC.75 As one commentator put it, a 
“cannabis culinary professional can infuse just about 
anything you want to eat with THC,” and the variety of 
available THC-infused food products is “a real testament to 
American entrepreneurialism and innovation.”76 
Those facts illustrate that the image of a twenty-
something smoking a doobie at the 1969 Woodstock music 
festival is no longer an accurate representation of today’s 
marijuana users, let alone the people who created and 
expanded that business after 1996. On the contrary, 
marijuana legalization is potentially a huge business for 
private parties and a new source of revenue for states.77 
 
 73. Recently, however, ENDDs, particularly when used by minors, have been 
associated with E-cigarette or Vaping Use-Associated Lung Injury. See, e.g., 
Editorial, The Vaping-Marijuana Nexus, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2019, 1:43 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-vaping-marijuana-nexus-11577299411?mod= 
searchresults&page=3&pos=11. 
 74. See, e.g., GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 31. 
 75. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 31; REGAN, supra note 11, at 41; Larkin, 
Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 318–19, 319 nn.15–16. 
 76. HUDAK, supra note 69, at 18–19. 
 77. Thompson, supra note 11, at 60 (“The legalization of recreational 
marijuana has proven to be a very lucrative decision for the American economy.”); 
see also, e.g., Ciara Linnane, Aurora Cannabis and Aphria Stocks Look More 
Attractive After Canopy Growth’s Friday Selloff: Cantor Fitzgerald, 
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2020, 7:04 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/aurora-cannabis-and-aphria-stocks-look-more-attractive-after-canopy-
growths-friday-selloff-cantor-fitzgerald-2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant 
=cx_2&cx_artPos=6; Ryan, Weed Versus Greed, supra note 67 (“Serious money is 
now flooding into marijuana. In the fourth quarter of 2018 alone, $7.9 billion of 
capital was raised by cannabis companies globally, according to the Viridian 
Cannabis Deal Tracker—nearly twice the amount raised in all of 2017.”). 
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Estimates from a few years ago were quite bullish. Wall 
Street predicted that marijuana legalization would generate 
billions of dollars in revenues for private growers and 
distributors, create thousands of jobs in the cannabis 
business, and produce millions in government revenues from 
taxes and fees.78 Some more recent reports were bearish on 
 
 78. See, e.g., Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More 
Jobs than Manufacturing by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017, 10:51 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/02/22/marijuana-industry-
projected-to-create-more-jobs-than-manufacturing-by-2020/ (“A new report from 
New Frontier Data projects that by 2020 the legal cannabis market will create 
more than a quarter of a million jobs. This is more than the expected jobs from 
manufacturing, utilities or even government jobs, according to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The BLS says that by 2024 manufacturing jobs are expected to 
decline by 814,000, utilities will lose 47,000 jobs and government jobs will decline 
by 383,000. This dovetails with data that suggests the fastest-growing industries 
are all healthcare related. The legal cannabis market was worth an estimated 
$7.2 billion in 2016 and is projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 17%. 
Medical marijuana sales are projected to grow from $4.7 billion in 2016 to $13.3 
billion in 2020. Adult recreational sales are estimated to jump from $2.6 billion 
in 2016 to $11.2 billion by 2020.”); Rory Carroll, Hippy Dream Now a Billion-
Dollar Industry with California Set to Legalize Cannabis, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 
2017, 3:30 PM), https://amp.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/30/california-
legalise-cannabis-hippy-dream-billion-dollar-industry (“The Salinas Valley, an 
agricultural zone south of San Francisco nicknamed America’s salad bowl, has 
already earned a new moniker: America’s cannabis bucket. Silicon Valley 
investors and other moneyed folk are hoping to mint fortunes by developing 
technology to cultivate, transport, store and sell weed. Entrepreneurs are 
devising pot-related products and services. Financiers are exploring ways to fold 
the revenue—estimated at $7bn per annum by 2020—into corporate banking.”); 
Chris Morris, Legal Marijuana Sales Are Expected to Hit $10 Billion This Year, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/06/legal-marijuana-sales-10-
billion/; Aaron Smith, Market for Legal Pot Could Pass $20 Billion, CNN 
BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2017, 7:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/09/ 
news/economy/marijuana-legalization-sales/index.html (“Voters in four states 
approved legal recreational pot on Tuesday. Four more states expanded access to 
medical marijuana. All told, it could expand the national market to $21 billion by 
2020, according to New Frontier Data, which partnered with the marijuana 
industry organization Arcview Group. That is up from $5.7 billion last year and 
an expected $7.9 billion this year.”); Aaron Smith, Colorado Passes a Milestone 
for Pot Revenue, CNN MONEY (July 19, 2017, 2:52 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/19/news/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenue/index 
.html (“VS Strategies, a pro-legalization research company in Denver, says that 
the state has pulled in $506 million since retail revenues began in January 
2014. . . . Revenue from taxes and fees has increased each year, from $76 million 
in 2014 to $200 million last year, and the state is on track to beat that this year, 
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the cannabis industry,79 but it appears to have survived the 
2020 recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.80 
Were cannabis to become a legalized commodity 
throughout the United States, over time the economy might 
come to treat it in the same manner as it handles tobacco or 
alcohol, analogous consumer products given their addictive 
 
according to VS Strategies, which used state revenue data in its report 
Wednesday.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Daniel Chase, Will These Marijuana Stocks Start To Rebound?, 
MARIJUANASTOCKS.COM (June 4, 2020), https://marijuanastocks.com/will-these-
marijuana-stocks-start-to-rebound/; Max A. Cherney, Pot Stocks Plunge after 
Another Round of Disappointing Earnings, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 30, 2020, 2:48 
PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pot-stocks-plunge-after-another-
round-of-disappointing-earnings-2020-03-30?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant= 
cx_2&cx_artPos=6; Charley Grant, Cannabis Stocks Take a Hit, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 3, 2020, 11:19), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-stocks-take-a-hit-
11583252358?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=16; Chris Kornelis, A CEO Tries 
to Navigate the Legal Cannabis Sector’s Bad Trip, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2020, 1:08 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-ceo-tries-to-navigate-the-legal-cannabis-
sectors-bad-trip-11583518019?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=5; Jacquie 
McNish & Vipal Monga, Marijuana Madness Turns into Cannabis Crash, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/marijuana-
madness-turns-into-a-cannabis-crash-11570888800?mod=article_inline; 
Alexander Osipovich, Cannabis Stocks Fall on Disappointing Earnings, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 14, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-stocks-fall-on-
disappointing-earnings-11573754223?mod=article_inline.  
 80. See, e.g., Editorial, California Deems Pot an Essential Coronavirus 
Business, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2020, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/california-deems-pot-an-essential-coronavirus-business-11585005903? 
mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=3; Max A. Cherney, Pot Shops Are Considered 
‘Essential’ Businesses in Most States Where It’s Legal, but the Rules Are Shifting, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 11, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/pot-shops-are-considered-essential-businesses-in-most-states-where-its-
legal-but-the-rules-are-shifting-2020-04-08; Gwynn Guilford, Guns, Groceries 
and News: What Sells in a Pandemic—and Doesn’t, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2020, 
11:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/groceries-guns-and-news-what-sells-in-
a-pandemicand-what-doesnt-11585042200?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=1 
(“Cannabis: Consumers are turning to cannabis too, according to data from 
Weedmaps, the nation’s largest legal cannabis marketing platform. On March 19, 
Weedmaps’ Travis Rexroad said the site’s users placed a record number of orders 
on the platform, surpassing sales volume booked last year on April 20, an 
unofficial day of cannabis celebration. The company has also noticed a growing 
share of orders for edible products, which can be discreetly consumed.”); 
Cannabis Sales Surge During Lock Down, CANNABIS NEWS WIRE (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cannabis-sales-surge-during-lock-
down-301082604.html.  
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potential, as explained below. Even so, the market would 
eventually treat the marijuana industry as just another 
business and cannabis as merely another item whose 
growers and sellers must navigate through the commercial 
and political worlds.81 That would not eliminate the need for 
specialists to guide firms through the statutes, rules, and 
policy preferences that federal, state, and local government 
officials would use to regulate commerce instead of the 
prohibitions currently in the CSA. Legalization would only 
reduce or eliminate the risk of criminal liability; it would not 
ease a company’s way to earn a profit or avoid the burden of 
complying with regulatory mandates. 
II. CANNABIS REGULATORY ISSUES 
A. Traditional Cannabis Regulatory Issues 
The debate over federal marijuana legalization 
occasionally seems like a binary choice between polar 
opposite approaches: allowing large-scale private ownership 
and commercialization of the means of production and 
distribution82 versus recommitting the nation to an 
 
 81. As one member of the industry put it: 
In the U.S. commercial world, cannabis will grow more complex than 
an ear of corn, which by itself doesn’t matter commercially or politically 
as much as farmers insurance for the corn grower, agricultural political 
action committees (PACs) that hunt for corn subsidies, ethanol for 
automobiles, high fructose corn syrup to save the U.S. sweet-lovers from 
Cuban sugarcane embargoes, irrigation equipment manufacturers, 
stock prices on one of hundreds of byproducts or direct supply chains and 
distribution networks from Nebraska to Maine and all the trucking and 
shipping companies that go with them, seed patents, and John Deere 
tractors. International commerce doesn’t care about ears of corn, 
either—it cares about export agreements, global shipping magnates, 
political stability, commodity futures, and food security for citizens and 
for key allies. 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiv. 
 82. That was what happened in the tobacco industry. See, e.g., ALLAN M. 
BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY (2007); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, GOLDEN 
HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE CIGARETTE CATASTROPHE AND THE CASE FOR 
ABOLITION (2011). Taking advantage of the cost-savings from the invention of a 
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overwhelming use of law enforcement in a crackdown on 
everyone who grows, distributes, or uses cannabis. Of course, 
numerous options fall between those extremes.83 In all 
likelihood, that middle ground is where any serious debate 
over the future of cannabis legalization would be conducted. 
Most existing state cannabis programs fall into that 
intermediate range,84 and every intermediate approach 
 
cigarette-rolling machine, James Buchanan Duke acquired roughly 250 tobacco 
companies and created the American Tobacco Company, which produced 
approximately 80 percent of all the cigarettes sold in the United States. See 
United States v. Am. Tobacco. Co., 221 U.S. 106, 155–75 (1911). The same type 
of consolidation is likely to occur in the cannabis industry because larger firms 
can take advantage of economies of scale that small boutique shops cannot. Hall 
& Lynskey, supra note 2, at 181. In fact, that might be happening already. See 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 14–15 (“[T]he cannabis industry is growing more 
stratified to reflect similar industries in agriculture, alcohol, tobacco, or 
pharmaceuticals. At the tip of the pyramid are those from the well-capitalized 
and well-established business and political worlds who are trying to fold their 
knowledge and lessons and experience into the new industry. Lower on the free 
market totem pole are the former black market actors, bootstrapped mom-and-
pop shops, and independent contractors.”). 
 83. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83 (“Fundamentally, state and 
national governments can either let the market work as independently as 
possible or take a very acting hand in restricting it. States can legalize only 
medical cannabis, limit the number of licenses in a given area, only allow 
nonprofits, set prices or control the supply, and take 100 other routes to keep the 
market under control.”); Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 179 (“In principle, adult 
cannabis use could be legalized in a range of different ways.  Individuals could be 
allowed to grow cannabis for their own use and gift it to others. They could be 
allowed to form cannabis growers’ clubs that produce cannabis solely for their 
members’ use. The government could create a monopoly in cannabis production 
and sales in order to minimize the promotion of cannabis use, as some US states 
and Canadian provinces have done with alcohol. The government could license 
non-profit cooperatives or charitable cooperatives that produce and sell cannabis 
without making a profit. Finally, governments could allow the commercialization 
of cannabis production and sale under a for-profit model like that used for 
alcohol.” (footnote omitted)). 
 84. See MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 70 (“While [California’s] 
Proposition 215 went into effect as a single page of untouched text, newer laws 
. . . were not implemented until more than one hundred pages of rules were 
added.”). Most states permitting recreational use of cannabis treat it like alcohol: 
they limit its sale to adults, while regulating the businesses that cultivate and 
distribute it. That approach is well known, convenient and consistent with the 
theory that cannabis is no more harmful than alcohol. See SUMMERS, supra note 
11, at 58; Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 180. 
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involves formal regulation by a state agency of some kind.85 
No state gives businesses free rein to sell anything and 
everything they might generate however they want. States 
have traditionally regulated local businesses since the 
colonial era86 under their inherent “police power.”87 That 
choice is a sensible and necessary one here too, for several 
reasons. Regulations allow the state to argue to the federal 
government that it is protecting consumers against 
charlatans and dangerous consumer goods. Regulation 
allows the state to earn income from licensing fees. And 
regulation provides enough of a state-action veneer that it 
might keep federal law enforcement officials at bay. A 
laissez-faire approach to cannabis distribution would be 
tantamount to encouraging private parties to flout the CSA 
at will, and the federal government would not sit idly by 
while marijuana traffickers rake in beaucoup bucks from 
illegal sales. Sergeant Schultz’s willful blindness was 
entertaining for viewers of “Hogan’s Heroes,”88 but the DEA 
will not laugh at someone who makes it look inept or 
 
 85. The absence of regulation, or the use of an inadequate regulatory system, 
could lead to a “Wild West” state of affairs. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 82 
(“Instead of reining in dispensaries, the poorly crafted moratorium turned Los 
Angeles into a medical marijuana boomtown. Within two years of the 
moratorium’s effective date, more than 800 dispensaries were operating in Los 
Angeles. They opened in upscale business districts; near schools, playgrounds, 
and youth centers; and in high-crime neighborhoods. And without an ordinance 
requiring a criminal background check, many observers wondered whether some 
dispensaries were little more than covers for illicit drug dealing.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 86. See, e.g., FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-
FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 50 (1989). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The 
Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 
61-80 (2016) [hereinafter, Larkin, Property] (summarizing economic regulation 
in the nation’s salad days). 
 87. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (describing 
the states’ “police power”). 
 88. See generally Des Hammond, The Very Best of Sergeant Schultz, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsXrpxo4uC0 (referencing 
Hogan’s Heroes (CBS television broadcast 1965–71)). 
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foolish.89 
Governments have traditionally justified regulation on 
economic and consumer safety rationales. Price regulation is 
necessary in sectors where there is a natural monopoly—that 
is, industries, such as railroad service, where it is inefficient 
to allow more than one company to operate. Governments 
license only one firm, but regulate the prices it can charge to 
prevent monopoly pricing.90 Product quality regulations 
protect consumers against hazardous goods. They ensure 
that a product is carefully grown or constructed; that it does 
not contain defects, toxins, impurities, or anything else that 
could harm consumers; and that it is appropriately packaged 
and labeled so that a purchaser knows what he or she is 
buying and what ingredients or components it contains, as 
well as prevent minors from easily accessing a potentially 
dangerous item.91  As discussed below, states have relied on 
both rationales to regulate this industry. 
Treating cannabis as a medicine or a consumer good 
involves far more than simply removing marijuana from the 
penal code.92 There are numerous policy questions regarding 
 
 89. Apparently, not everyone got that message. See, e.g., GREG CAMPBELL, 
POT, INC.: INSIDE MEDICAL MARIJUANA, AMERICA’S MOST OUTLAW INDUSTRY ix–xi 
(2012); GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 92 (“The most embarrassing setbacks for the 
industry . . . were dispensary owners who behaved like big-shot drug dealers 
rather than compassionate caregivers. It was well known in the medical cannabis 
industry that the DEA frowned upon dispensary owners who promoted their 
businesses on a large scale, flaunted their wealth, or took on the flamboyant 
characteristics of illicit drug dealers. Yet some dispensary owners couldn’t resist 
the temptation.”); id. at 93–96 (describing how the DEA pursued such parties). 
 90. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982) (“The 
most traditional and persistent rationale for governmental regulation of a firm’s 
prices and profits is the existence of a ‘natural monopoly.’ Some industries, it is 
claimed, cannot efficiently support more than one firm.”). 
 91. See id. at 33–34 (discussing “moral hazard” (viz., where goods affect third 
parties) and “paternalism” (viz., where consumers make improvident decisions) 
as bases for regulation). 
 92. See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS xiii (2015) 
[hereinafter CAULKINS, INSIGHT] (“Legalization is not simply a binary choice 
between making the production, sale, and possession of the drug legal on the one 
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the implementation of any such program that elected 
officials should answer.93 Among them are the following:  
• Should a state adopt a medical-use program, a 
recreational-use program, or both?94 
 
hand and continuing existing prohibitions on the other. Legalization 
encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along at least four 
dimensions: the kinds of organizations that are allowed to provide the drug, the 
regulations under which those organizations operate, the nature of the products 
that can be distributed, and price. These choices could have profound 
consequences for the outcomes of legalization in terms of health and social well-
being, as well as for job creation and government revenue.”); SUMMERS, supra 
note 11, at xv (“In the black market, cannabis was untracked and untraced but 
largely uncomplicated: grow pot, sell pot, avoid cops. When and if cannabis 
becomes legal, it becomes part of the mix between corporate juggernaut and the 
leviathan, something inconceivably more complex.”). 
 93. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the implementation 
issues, see CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 101–14. See also, e.g., JONATHAN 
P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 
(2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA]; Caulkins, Marijuana 
Dangers, supra note 16, at 33; Benedikt Fisher et al., Commentary, Considering 
the Health and Social Welfare Impacts of Non-medical Cannabis Legalization, 19 
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 187 (2020); Beau Kilmer, Policy Designs for Cannabis 
Legalization: Starting with the Eight Ps, 40 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 259-
61 (2014); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 16, at 78; Mark 
A.R. Kleiman, How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Mar./Apr./May 2014) [hereinafter Kleiman, Cannabis Hash], 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchaprilmay-2014/how-not-to-
make-a-hash-out-of-cannabis-legalization/; Rosario Queirolo, Commentary, The 
Effects of Recreational Cannabis Legalization Might Depend upon the Policy 
Model, 19 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 195 (2020).   
 94. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83–84 (“The biggest commercial 
difference is medical vs. recreational. Most nations start with medical programs, 
and U.S. states follow the same pattern. This not only takes some pressure off 
the black market, but establishes the groundwork for a more well-oiled 
recreational machine further down the line (though some states and nations deny 
they have any interests).”) If a state adopts only a medical-use program, the 
question arises whether the legislature, an implementing agency, or a treating 
physician should decide for what conditions cannabis can be recommended. 
Numerous physicians have argued that cannabis is a legitimate medical 
treatment for a host of ailments. See, e.g., DAVID BEARMAN WITH MARIA PETTINATO, 
CANNABIS MEDICINE: A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICE OF CANNABINOID MEDICINE (2019); 
DAVID CASARETT, STONED: A DOCTOR’S CASE FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA (2015); 
PATRICIA C. FRYE WITH DAVE SMITHERMAN, THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA GUIDE: 
CANNABIS AND YOUR HEALTH (2018); BONNI GOLDSTEIN, CANNABIS REVEALED 
(2016); THE POT BOOK, supra note 11; MICHAEL H. MOSKOWITZ, MEDICAL CANNABIS 
(2017); J. Michael Bostwick, Clinical Decision, Medicinal Use of Marijuana—
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• What type of agency should be tasked with 
regulating the cannabis industry—for example, a 
state public health department or its revenue 
department?95 
 
Recommend the Medical Use of Marijuana, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 866, 866–68 
(2013); Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorial, Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 366 (1997). Yet, there are risks in handing the decision entirely 
over to physicians. Some states have broadly defined or loosely applied medical 
cannabis program laws that are just a sham for legalized recreational use. See 
MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 66–67 (“Proposition 215, as written and 
passed, was exceedingly vague. The law allowed unlimited cannabis for any 
condition. Odorous flatulence? A viable excuse. Chronic hangnail? You bet. Only 
a doctor’s note stood between Californians and legal cannabis; for the first time 
they were able to possess, grow, or consume as much as they wanted.”); Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and Drugged Driving, 52 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 453, 509–12 (2015) [hereinafter Larkin, Drugged Driving]. 
California’s Compassionate Use Act identified permissible conditions for which a 
physician could recommend marijuana (e.g., chemotherapy-induced nausea), but 
also contained a catchall provision allowing a physician to recommend it for any 
condition for which he thought it might be useful. Provisions like that are an 
invitation to recommend marijuana to treat anything, even just “feeling a little 
blue” one day. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83–84. Other ancillary issues are 
whether to require patient registration with the state; whether a patient (or his 
“caregiver”) can or must grow his own cannabis; how much cannabis or how many 
plants someone can possess or grow; whether to allow private businesses to open 
cannabis dispensaries (and, if so, on a for-profit or not-for-profit basis) but limit 
their number; and so forth. Id. at 86–88. In theory, medical and recreational 
programs could create very different markets. Id. at 84 (“Medical programs do 
not create the same kind of roaring commercialism the recreational cannabis 
industry produces. More often, medical programs simply produce an array of 
oligopolies that are then poised to corner the recreational market when that state 
decides to go all the way with its policy. In terms of money, the recreational 
industry is king.”). Some states with both programs tax medical cannabis 
purchases at a lower rate than recreation-use purchases. Those states have to 
ensure that people are not obtaining medical-use cards simply to avoid paying 
taxes. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Rules for the Marijuana Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/opinion/high-time-rules-for-the-
marijuana-market.html?searchResultPosition=14 (“States with an existing 
medical marijuana market will also have to make sure that users are not abusing 
it to evade taxes. In Colorado, for example, there are more than 111,000 people 
with medical marijuana cards. Those users can buy the drug at much lower tax 
rates [7.62%] than people buying recreational marijuana [21.12%] . . . . The 
problem is that almost anyone can get a card on a doctor’s recommendation.”).  
 95. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-3 (LexisNexis 2020) (vesting regulatory 
authority in the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado Department of 
Revenue). That choice is an important one. A state health department will focus 
on enhancing the safety of the product and the health of its consumers, while a 
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• Should the forms and potency of cannabis be 
limited or left to market forces?96  
• Should each person be permitted—or required—to 
grow cannabis for his or her personal medical or 
recreational use, or should private enterprises be 
free to become involved?97 
• Should the industry be freely open to all comers or 
should there be a limited number of growers and 
 
state revenue department will seek to raise state revenue above all else. See, e.g., 
CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 102 (“One might expect, as a general rule, 
that a liquor-control board (such as in Washington) might be more cognizant of 
the special circumstances surrounding a dependence-inducing intoxicant than 
would, say, a department of revenue, as in Colorado, which might be more focused 
on good governance that is mindful of matters of process and equitable treatment 
across licensees. One might also expect that neither would necessarily have as 
much of a proactive focus on protecting public health as a health or child-welfare 
agency would. Thus, it is useful and important to consider the role (and perhaps 
leadership or co-leadership) of a public health–minded state agency.”); cf. Carol 
Ryan, Pot Industry Underestimates Old-School Dealers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 
2019, 7:34 AM) [hereinafter Ryan, Old-School], https://www.wsj.com/articles/pot-
industry-underestimates-old-school-dealers-11566214441?mod=searchresults 
&page=7&pos=3 (“Several factors are stymieing legitimate sales. . . . [T]he main 
barrier is the markup on legal cannabis from high taxes and the cost of complying 
with complex regulations. Consumers pay 77% more for the same product from a 
legal vendor, according to BDS Analytics. Unless taxes are cut, the research 
house expects almost half of California’s cannabis spending to remain in the 
illegal market in 2024.”).  
 96. Cannabis can be sold in a traditional cigarette-like format or in numerous 
other forms, including a variety of edible forms. The potency of marijuana has 
increased greatly since the Summer of Love in 1968, when it was in the low single 
digits. Today, potency can vary from 30 to 90-plus percent. CAULKINS, INSIGHT, 
supra note 92, at 106–08; Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 318–21, 319 
nn.15–16, 337–38, 337 nn.56–62. 
 97. Vermont and the District of Columbia allow individuals to grow cannabis 
for their own use or to give it away, but they prohibit its sale. See, e.g., Hall & 
Lynskey, supra note 2, at 180. Most states with recreational use laws allow each 
person to grow a limited number of plants per person (say, 6) or per household 
(say, 12). SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 59; see, e.g., id. at xiii–xiv (“What’s good for 
industry is good for legalization campaigns, and vice versa. Behind pot 
legalization is a fresh, new industrial complex all its own. The states that have 
had the most success and received the most press are those with the commercial 
recreational model, rather than the more highly controlled medical options or less 
consumerist decriminalization options practiced by other states. Consumer 
choice, profit motive, and need for taxes accelerated the cannabis reform 
movement to its present American speed.”). 
2021] CANNABIS CAPITALISM 249 
distributors?98 
• What qualifications should exist for a licensee? In 
particular, should a criminal record (especially for 
drug trafficking) be a disqualification?99 
• How should a state license and inspect growers 
 
 98. Legalization options include the following: allowing small-scale 
cooperatives to combine resources for members, limiting the number of growers 
and retailers in a state or county, deciding whether to allow companies to 
vertically integrate and operate cultivation facilities and retail stores, deciding 
whether to allow counties to supplement state regulation, deciding whether to 
use the criminal justice system to police the cannabis business or turn 
enforcement over to a civil regulatory agency, deciding what licensing scheme is 
optimal, deciding whether to allow delivery service, and so forth. See, e.g., 
CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 108–09, 111–12; Bajaj, supra note 94 (“For 
each level of the industry, licensing systems ought to discourage the 
concentration of market power in the hands of a few businesses. It’s important 
for regulators to recall the American experience with the tobacco industry, which 
is dominated by a handful of large corporations. For decades, those big cigarette 
companies undermined scientific research into the damage their products were 
causing and blocked sensible regulations. If states allow marijuana businesses to 
become too big, they could face corporate juggernauts that may be hard to 
regulate.”). Most states allow commercial businesses to enter the industry. See, 
e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiii–xiv; cf. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 88 
(describing a 2010 Los Angeles ordinance limiting the number and location of 
medical marijuana dispensaries). The number of licensees could affect the supply 
and therefore the price. See, e.g., Ryan, Cannabis Supply, supra note 68 (“When 
adult use was legalized in Oregon four years ago, too many growing licenses were 
issued. That has led to excess inventory—6.5 years’ worth, according to a 2019 
Oregon Liquor Control Commission report. The price paid by consumers for 
usable marijuana has more than halved to less than $5 a gram in the past two 
years.”). A large number of retail stores might be positively associated with 
increased cannabis use. See, e.g., CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 108 (“The 
alcohol literature suggests that alcohol outlet density is positively associated with 
the prevalence of alcohol-related problems . . . . There is suggestive evidence that 
marijuana could experience a similar fate: States that allow medical-marijuana 
dispensaries experience a higher adult prevalence rate.” (citations omitted)).  
 99. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:2-205 to 212-3:2-280 (application and 
licensing rules), 212-3:5-105 to 212-3.5-730 (medical marijuana stores), 212-3:6-
105 to 212-3:6-115 (retail marijuana stores) (LexisNexis 2020). That issue is 
particularly salient in connection with efforts to increase minority ownership of 
companies in the cannabis industry. The argument is that minorities have borne 
the brunt of the drug war, a disproportionate number of Blacks and Hispanics 
therefore have criminal records, and treating that fact as a disqualification for 
ownership interest would have a disproportionate adverse effect on minorities. 
See, e.g., Beau Kilmer & Erin Kilmer Neel, Being Thoughtful About Cannabis 
Legalization and Social Equity, 19 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 194 (2020). 
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and distributors and, in general, enforce the new 
regulatory program?100 
• What, if any, price regulations should be 
adopted?101 
 
 100. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:8-105 to 212-3:8-130 (enforcement), 
§§ 212-3:8-205 to 212-3:8-240 (discipline) (LexisNexis 2020); CAULKINS, INSIGHT, 
supra note 92, at 114 (“Enforcement of regulations will fall on a variety of 
agencies, as described in greater detail in Chapter Seven, and is likely to involve 
the cost of regulating licenses (growing, processing, distributing, and retail 
selling), regulating products (testing inspections, product availability in stores, 
random compliance checks), checking compliance and enforcing marketing 
regulations, regulating sales to out-of-state residents, regulating sales to and 
possession by minors, and regulating use and possession (e.g., in public parks, in 
restaurants.”). “Regulators usually chop the cannabis industry into a handful of 
licenses that match a particular business type. Depending on the state, these 
licenses can include retail, cultivation, testing, transportation, production, 
manufacturing, or medical care givers.”  SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 58. For a lay 
overview of the marijuana licensing requirements and process, see id. at 56–59. 
A slow licensing process, whether accomplished intentionally or otherwise, can 
stall a nascent industry. 
 101. Price controls are like taxes. They are inversely related to demand and 
directly related to the presence of a black market. See, e.g., DAVENPORT, supra 
note 11, at 143–48; Tom James, The Failed Promise of Legal Pot, ATLANTIC 
(May 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/legal-
pot-and-the-black-market/481506/ (“[W]hat is keeping people in Colorado’s 
black market is price, with a dose of convenience thrown in, says Mark 
Vasquez, a former narcotics detective . . . . ‘The black market,’ he says, ‘is 
alive and well and will continue to thrive in Colorado.’ There are a few basic 
reasons for this. First, the medical market, Vasquez says, can sell 
marijuana more cheaply than the state-licensed and -regulated stores 
because medical dispensaries don’t have to charge most of the combined 27.9 
percent tax on the drug. This increases the resale of medical marijuana on 
the street. Second, there are the plants that are grown for personal use, 
which are allowed under the law. Vasquez says the result is a steady supply 
of marijuana not only for street dealers but also for Craigslist sales, which 
have become so ubiquitous that some city departments don’t have the 
resources to crack down on them.”); James Queally & Patrick McGreevy, 
Nearly 3,000 Illegal Marijuana Businesses Found in California Audit, Dwarfing 
Legal Trade, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019, 5:14 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-11/california-marijuana-black-
market-dwarfs-legal-pot-industry (“California’s black market for cannabis is at 
least three times the size of its regulated weed industry, according to an audit 
made public Wednesday, the latest indication of the state’s continued struggle to 
tame a cannabis economy that has long operated in legal limbo. . . . Legitimate 
marijuana businesses have repeatedly criticized state leaders and law 
enforcement for failing to curb unlicensed dispensaries and delivery services, 
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• Should localities be able to impose their own 
regulations, or even ban cannabis sales altogether 
under a so-called “local option”?102  
• What state and local tax rules are appropriate? In 
particular, what is the appropriate tax rate?103 
 
which sell cannabis at a much lower price by skirting state and municipal 
cannabis taxes.”).  
 102. See CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 110; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 
25–26 (“Most states with legal pot let local government create their own 
regulations, including an option to opt out of state law and keep cannabis illegal 
within their borders. So far [viz. as of 2018] only Washington does not allow local 
opt-out options, though several towns in Washington do so anyway. This creates 
layers and layers of complexity and cost. For example, a retail shop in Denver 
must go through two separate licensing ordeals—one from the Colorado 
Marijuana Enforcement Division and one from the City of Denver—pay taxes to 
two different entitles, and adjust the business to two different sets of zoning 
standards—all the while complying with whatever they must do to stay out of the 
federal spotlight.”). If a state empowers localities to add their own regulations, a 
locality will need to decide how to zone for cannabis growing or retail operations. 
One decision that a city or country must make is whether it should spread out or 
concentrate retail cannabis stores. Each option has costs and benefits. For 
example, concentrating them in an area zoned for industrial use might keep them 
away from schools, playgrounds, and parks, but it might blight one area and drive 
up the real estate market. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 57. 
 103. See, e.g., CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 115–43; SUMMERS, supra 
note 11, at 95–103; JOSEPH HENCHMAN & MORGAN SCARBORO, TAX FOUND., 
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND TAXES: LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES FROM COLORADO 
AND WASHINGTON (Special Rep. No. 231, 2016). Some politicians tout cannabis 
legalization as a way of boosting state treasuries through so-called “sin” taxes.  
Joseph De Avila, Connecticut Governor Pitches Legalizing Marijuana, Other 
Measures in Budget, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/cannabis-company-acreage-enters-funding-agreements-for-up-to-60-
million-2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=6. Most states 
with legalized cannabis impose an excise tax on producers and a sales tax on 
retailers based on the retail price. Prices have fallen since the state legalization 
programs came on board, because in those states there is no need for a surcharge 
to offset the risk of state criminal liability. A weight-based tax approach would 
incentivize retailers to offer higher THC content products, such as extracts with 
70 percent or greater THC content. Pricing the THC content or imposing a 
minimum unit price could reduce that incentive, but no state has yet done so. 
Deciding what the tax rate should be is a tricky issue. Set the rate too low and 
you fall short of projected receipts. Set the rate too high and you encourage black 
market sales. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 13–14, 97–98; Hall & Lynskey, 
supra note 2, at 180–81; Bajaj, supra note 94 (“Regulators will have to design 
policies that allow licensed businesses to undercut the illegal market but keep 
prices high enough so dependence on the drug does not increase a lot.”). Of course, 
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• Should tax receipts be dedicated to a particular 
fund, such as treatment of cannabis dependence 
or other state or local government functions, such 
as schools, social services, or public employee 
salaries?104 
Elected officials, of course, have a powerful incentive to 
answer as few of those questions as possible. Every decision 
risks antagonizing some of the electorate (or their donors),105 
 
large amounts of “loose cash” floating around the cannabis industry make it 
difficult to determine whether firms are paying what they owe. Quinton, supra 
note 62, at 61. 
 104. See, e.g., Marijuana Tax Reports, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
https://cdor.colorado.gov/data-and-reports/marijuana-data/marijuana-tax-
reports (March 2021) (reporting approximately $223 million in overall revenue 
from marijuana sales for FY 2019 (Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 2019) and approximately 
$1.2 billion from February 1, 2014 (when the Colorado Department of Revenue 
began reporting data) to December 2019); Heather Gillers, Is Your City’s Pension 
Fund a Little Short?  Marijuana Might Help, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-your-citys-pension-fund-a-little-short-
marijuana-might-help-11580812201?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=14. As 
for the use of cannabis tax receipts: Sales and income taxes generate income for 
local and state governments that can be used for cannabis treatment programs 
or the myriad other state budget items. Yet, in the long term cannabis 
legalization could leave states and localities in the red due to the costs of 
marijuana use, such as increased emergency room expenses from motor vehicle 
accidents and overdoses, as well as lost income as the number of long-term users 
increases (particularly, ones who initiated cannabis use during their 
adolescence). See CENTENNIAL INST., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF LEGALIZED 
MARIJUANA 3 (2018) (“For every dollar gained in tax revenue, Coloradans spend 
approximately $4.50 to mitigate the effects of legalization. Costs related to the 
healthcare system and from high school dropouts are the largest cost 
contributors, but many other costs were included as well. Costs of marijuana 
ranged from accidental poisonings and traffic fatalities to increased court costs 
for impaired drivers, juvenile use, and employer related costs.”); see also 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 100; Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 
10, at 130–31. 
 105. Polls indicate that a majority of Americans favor making cannabis more 
available, particularly for medical use. See, e.g., John Hudak & Christine 
Stenglein, Public Opinion and America’s Experimentation with Cannabis 
Reform, in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 15–34; Zusha Elinson, 
Voters Approve Recreational Marijuana in Four States, Medical Marijuana in 
Three Others, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/voters-
approve-recreational-marijuana-in-at-least-three-states-medical-marijuana-in-
others-1478677170?mod=article_inline (“Sixty percent of Americans now favor 
legalizing marijuana, according to a Gallup poll from October. That is the highest 
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and no elected official eager to be re-elected will intentionally 
antagonize a single-issue voting bloc, even a small one, 
because such groups have an outsized effect on the political 
process.106 That explains why most legalization programs 
result from voter referendums, rather than the traditional 
legislative process.107 The safer course is to create a new 
administrative agency (or task an existing one) with the 
responsibility to promulgate rules, at least in the first 
instance, when implementing the new program.108 States 
 
level of support since Gallup first asked the question back in 1969 when just 12% 
of Americans supported legalization.”). Yet, that majority opinion does not 
guarantee that a vote in favor of legalization avoids political risks. Elected 
officials represent particular states or counties, and national polls do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of the people in those regions. The residents in 
New York City and Salt Lake City might have very different views about the 
wisdom of allowing cannabis to be sold for recreational use. Moreover, the people 
who favor legalization do not deem this issue as a particularly important one. 
Hudak & Stenglein, supra, at 31. Finally, there is always the “not-in-my-
backyard” (or NIMBY) problem—viz., people who support marijuana legalization 
as long as no dispensary opens in their neighborhood. See GELUARDI, supra note 
11, at 86. 
 106. An interest group representing only a minority of voters who intensely 
oppose marijuana legalization can stymie legislative steps toward legalization 
despite nationwide majority support for that policy. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6, 13–17 (1974) (participants in the 
political process will seek to further their own interests, rather than the “public 
interest”); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (explaining 
why, according to collection action theory, a small coherent interest group with 
intensely-held views on a single issue can have more legislative influence than a 
majority of the population). 
 107. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiii; Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, 
at 179. For example, in Colorado the voters authorized medical use of cannabis 
in 2000 and recreational use 12 years later in separate amendments to the state 
constitution. COLO. CONST.  art. 18, § 14 (authorizing medical marijuana use); id. 
art. 18, § 16 (authorizing adult recreational marijuana use). The state later 
passed implementing legislation. See, e.g., S.B 19-224, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2019). 
 108. Legislators could ask a task force for recommendations on those issues. 
Colorado did so after the electorate legalized recreational-use marijuana in 2012. 
See, e.g., STATE OF COLO., TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AMENDMENT 64 (2013). That would give the legislature the benefit of outside 
advice, which provides some cover, but it still leaves decision-making 
responsibility with elected officials. 
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like Colorado have done just that.109 Once the legislature 
makes that assignment, the cannabis regulatory body, like 
every other administrative agency, will then govern the 
industry through a combination of licensing, inspections, 
enforcement proceedings, rulemaking, adjudication, advice-
giving, and whatever informal “arm-twisting” agency 
officials can muster.110 
B. Nontraditional Cannabis Regulatory Issues 
Cannabis raises concerns not present in the case of most 
consumer goods. Two in particular stand out. One is that 
users can consume far too much of it and become dependent 
on it; the other is that people will become intoxicated by 
marijuana and drive, which puts them at risk of grave injury 
or death, along with passengers, pedestrians, and other 
 
 109. Colorado regulates the sale of recreational-use cannabis through the 
Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Department of Revenue. See, e.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-10-101 to 44-10-1301 (West 2020); COLO. CODE REGS. 
§§ 212-3:1-105 to 8-200 (LexisNexis 2020); webpage of the Marijuana 
Enforcement Division, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/ 
pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (last visited May 21, 2020). See 
generally John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A 
Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 649 
(2015); Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We 
Learned Anything at All?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 221, 224–27 (2019) [hereinafter 
Kamin, Colorado’s Regulation]. That agency has collected the relevant statutes 
and rules in a manual that rivals Anna Karenina in length.  Compare COLO. DEP’T 
OF REVENUE MARIJUANA ENF’T DIV., COLORADO MARIJUANA LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS (2020) (more than 800 pages long), with LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA 
KARENINA (Rosamund Bartlett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1878) (896 pages 
long). Some states have even agreed to establish common regional regulatory 
schemes. See Joseph De Avila, Four Northeastern Governors Team Up on Vaping 
and Marijuana Standards, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-northeastern-governors-team-up-on-vaping-
and-marijuana-standards-11571347342?mod=article_inline.  
 110. To be sure, creating a cannabis regulatory framework, regardless of how 
strict it might be, does not eliminate all political risks. Some voters will treat any 
vote in favor of a regulatory program as a tacit endorsement of cannabis use, 
while others will see any restraint on its use as an arbitrary restriction on their 
rights. Why? As Peter Hitchens has noted, “Cannabis is not merely a drug. It is 
a cause.” PETER HITCHENS, THE WAR WE NEVER FOUGHT: THE BRITISH 
ESTABLISHMENT’S SURRENDER TO DRUGS 3 (2012). 
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drivers. Traditional price and quality regulation will not 
prevent those harms. Other supply-side regulations are 
necessary. 
1. Two Problems: Cannabis Dependence and Driving 
Under the Influence of Cannabis  
The cannabis plant is a peculiar consumer good because 
it can harm users and third parties. The reason why is that 
it contains THC, the psychoactive ingredient responsible for 
its euphoric effect.111 Unfortunately, for some people the 
“rush” that marijuana produces is more a curse than a 
blessing. Heavy or long-term cannabis use can lead to 
tolerance, which requires increasing amounts of THC to 
produce the desired effect.112 Heavy or long-term use can also 
damage executive mental functioning,113 as well as lead 
 
 111. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS 
AND CANNABINOIDS 54 tbl.2-2 (2017). Given its pharmacodynamics (the effect of a 
drug on the body), THC certainly qualifies as a “drug” for purposes of the Federal 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: a non-food substance consumed for the 
euphoria it produces. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (“The term ‘drug means (A) articles 
recognized in the official United States Pharmacopœia, official Homœopathic 
Pharmacopœia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any 
supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a 
component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).”). 
 112. See, e.g., CARLTON K. ERICKSON, THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 28–30 (2d ed. 
2018). 
 113. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF 
NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE 15 (2016) (“The daily use of cannabis over years and 
decades appears to produce persistent impairments in memory and cognition, 
especially when cannabis use begins in adolescence.”); JERROLD S. MEYER & LINDA 
F. QUENZER, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 416 (2d ed. 2018) (“Heavy cannabis use for a 
long period of time may lead to impaired executive functioning for at least 2 to 3 
weeks following cessation of use . . . . However, some of the data suggest that 
heavy, long-time users may continue to show impairment in decision making, 
planning, and concept formation.”); id. at 422–25 (discussing potential adverse 
psychological, neuropsychiatric, and physiological effects from long-term use); id. 
at 424–25 (discussing potential psychosis-causing effect of early-onset, long-term 
use); CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 107 (“[A] relatively small number of 
heavy users account for the great bulk of total purchases; many of them have 
built up a chemical tolerance to the effects of THC and need higher doses than 
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users to become dependent on the drug,114 which causes them 
to suffer withdrawal symptoms when they discontinue its 
use.115 The 2013 edition of the American Psychiatric 
 
other consumers to achieve the effect they desire.”); Marta Di Forti et 
al., Proportion of Patients in South London with First-Episode Psychosis 
Attributable to Use of High Potency Cannabis: A Case-Control Study, 2 LANCET 
PSYCHIATRY 233, 236 (2015) (“People who used cannabis or skunk every day 
were both roughly three times more likely to have a diagnosis of a psychotic 
disorder than were those who never used cannabis.”); Marie Stefanie Kejser 
Starzer et al., Rates and Predictors of Conversion to Schizophrenia or Bipolar 
Disorder Following Substance-Induced Psychosis, 175 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 343, 346 
(2018) (“We found that 32.2% of patients with a substance-induced psychosis 
later converted to either bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. The highest 
conversion rate (47.4%) was found for cannabis-induced psychosis. Young age 
was associated with a higher risk of conversion to schizophrenia; the risk was 
highest for those in the range of 16-25 years. Self-harm after a substance-induced 
psychosis was significantly linked to a higher risk of converting to both 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.”).  
 114. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA 14 (Aug. 2017) 
(“Marijuana use can lead to the development of problem use, known as a 
marijuana use disorder, which takes the form of addiction in severe cases. Recent 
data suggest that 30% of those who use marijuana may have some degree of 
marijuana use disorder.”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 509–16 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] 
(discussing diagnosis of “Cannabis Use Disorder”); ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 
175–76, 267; WAYNE HALL & ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, CANNABIS USE AND 
DEPENDENCE (2003); MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 113, at 420 (noting that 10% 
of marijuana users become dependent, while 50% of daily users do so); CANNABIS 
DEPENDENCE (Roger A. Roffman & Robert S. Stephens eds., 2006); Udo Bonnet & 
Ulrich W. Preuss, The Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome: Current Insights, 8 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & REHABILITATION 9 (2017); Alan J. Budney & John R. Hughes, 
The Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome, 19 CURRENT OPS. PSYCHIATRY 233 (2006); 
Itai Danovitch & David A. Gorelick, State of the Art Treatments for Cannabis 
Dependence, 35 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 309 (2012); Margaret Haney, The 
Marijuana Withdrawal Syndrome: Diagnosis and Treatment, 7 CURRENT 
PSYCHIATRY REP. 360 (2005); Wayne Hall, What Has Research Over the Past Two 
Decades Revealed About the Adverse Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis 
Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19 (2014); Wayne Hall & Nadia Solowij, Long Term 
Cannabis Use and Mental Health, 171 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 107 (1997); Lindsey 
A. Hines et al., Association of High-Potency Cannabis Use with Mental Health 
and Substance Use in Adolescence, 77 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1044 (2020).  
 115. See, e.g., Anees Bahji et al., Prevalence of Cannabis Withdrawal 
Symptoms Among People with Regular or Dependent Use of Cannabinoids: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Apr. 2020, at 1, 11; 
Alan J.  Budney et al., Review of the Validity and Significance of Cannabis 
Withdrawal Syndrome, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1967 (2004); Alan J.  Budney et 
al., The Time Course and Significance of Cannabis Withdrawal, 112 J. ABNORMAL 
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Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders defines that condition as “Cannabis Use 
Disorder.”116 
Like most issues concerning marijuana, the subject of 
dependency has been a contentious one. Some marijuana 
supporters have denied that it has any potential for 
dependency, and some of its opponents have claimed that it 
always leads to addiction.117 The truth lies between the 
extremes. Approximately ten percent of the people who ever 
smoke marijuana become dependent on it, but that risk goes 
up for someone who uses cannabis frequently, particularly 
when regular use began during adolescence.118 According to 
 
PSYCH. 393 (2003); Alan J. Budney et al., Marijuana Withdrawal Among Adults 
Seeking Treatment for Marijuana Dependence, 94 ADDICTION 1311 (1999); Wilson 
M. Compton et al., Marijuana Use and Use Disorders in Adults in the USA, 2002–
14: Analysis of Annual Cross-Sectional Surveys, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 954 (2016); 
David A. Gorelick et al., Diagnostic Criteria for Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome, 
123 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 141 (2012); Esme Fuller-Thomson et al., Is 
Recovery from Cannabis Dependence Possible? Factors that Help or Hinder 
Recovery in a National Sample of Canadians with a History of Cannabis 
Dependence, ADVANCES IN PREVENTATIVE MED., Apr. 15, 2020, at 1; Deborah S. 
Hasin et al., Prevalence of Marijuana Use Disorders in the United States Between 
2001–2002 and 2012–2013, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1235 (2015); Deborah S. Hasin 
et al., Cannabis Withdrawal in the United States: Results from NESARC, 69 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1354 (2008). Cannabis withdrawal symptoms include 
craving, irritability, depression, anxiety, restlessness, weakness, and sleep 
disruption. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. MILLER ET AL., TREATING ADDICTION, 39, 96 box 
6.6, 290 box 18.2 (2011) (describing the symptoms of cannabis withdrawal); Alan 
J.  Budney et al., Comparison of Cannabis and Tobacco Withdrawal: Severity and 
Contribution to Relapse, 35 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 362 (2008); M. Claire 
Greene & John F. Kelly, The Prevalence of Cannabis Withdrawal and Its 
Influence on Adolescents’ Treatment Response and Outcomes: A 12-Month 
Prospective Investigation, 8 J. ADDICTION MED. 359, 361–62 tbl.1 (2014). 
 116. DSM-5, supra note 114, at 509–16 (discussing diagnosis of “Cannabis Use 
Disorder”); see Alan J. Budney et al., Update on the Treatment of Cannabis Use 
Disorder, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 236; 
Tammy A. Chung & Ken C. Winters, Clinical Characteristics of Cannabis Use 
Disorder, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 72.  
 117. See IVERSEN, supra note 17, at 106–13, 209–12 (noting the competing 
views).   
 118. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 267; HALL & PACULA, supra note 
114, at 75–78; ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (noting that the risk of dependence 
is “around 9% among persons who have ever used cannabis”); James C. Anthony 
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cannabis experts Wayne Hall and Rosalie Pacula, “the 
following rules of thumb” are useful in determining the 
likelihood of dependence: The risk is one in ten for people 
who have ever used cannabis. Using the drug on more than 
a few occasions increases the risk to between one in five and 
one in three. Use it daily and the risk jumps to approximately 
one in two.119 The risk is even higher for someone who begins 
marijuana use during adolescence, given the labile nature of 
the adolescent brain.120 
 
et al., Comparative Epidemiology of Dependence on Tobacco, Alcohol, Controlled 
Substances, and Inhalants: Basic Findings from the National Comorbidity 
Survey, 2 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 244 (1994) (noting 
that 9 percent of all cannabis users met the DSM-III-R criteria for cannabis 
dependence at some point in their lives); Beau Kilmer, Recreational Cannabis—
Minimizing the Health Risks from Legalization, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 705, 705 
(2017) (“Approximately 9% of people who try cannabis meet criteria for cannabis 
dependence at some point. The rate roughly doubles for those who initiate use 
before 17 years of age and is much higher for adolescents who use cannabis 
weekly or more often.”); Catalina Lopez-Quintero et al., Probability and 
Prediction of Transition from First Use to Dependence on Nicotine, Alcohol, 
Cannabis, and Cocaine: Results of the National Epidemiological Survey on 
Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), 115 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
120, 126 (2011) (“[C]umulative probability estimates indicated that 67.5% of 
nicotine users, 22.7% of alcohol users, 20.9% of cocaine users, and 8.9% of 
cannabis users would become dependent at some time in their life.”); Randi 
Melissa Schuster et al., Effects of Adolescent Cannabis Use on Brain Structure 
and Function: Current Findings and Recommendations for Future Research, in 
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 91–92 (noting 
that the “lifetime risk” for cannabis dependence is “17% when use is initiated as 
a teenager,” “approximately 9%” when use begins as an adult, and “25% to 50% 
in those who use daily”); id. (noting that the “rate of transition from non-
problematic to problematic cannabis use may occur more rapidly with cannabis 
than nicotine or alcohol use,” although fewer cannabis users progress to 
dependence than nicotine or alcohol users (9 percent versus 67 and 23 percent, 
respectively)).   
 119. HALL & PACULA, supra note 114, at 75; id. at 78. 
 120. According to Dr. Nora Volkow, Director of the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, “[A]s compared with persons who begin to use marijuana in adulthood, 
those who begin to use in adolescence are approximately 2 to 4 times as likely to 
have symptoms of cannabis dependence within 2 years after first use.”  Volkow 
et al., supra note 8, at 2220; see also, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE 15 (2016) (“The daily use of 
cannabis over years and decades appears to produce persistent impairments in 
memory and cognition, especially when cannabis use begins in adolescence.”); 
ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (noting that the risk of dependence is “about one 
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To be sure, the risk of addiction to someone who samples 
any psychoactive drug is low,121 and cannabis is not as 
addictive as other drugs, such as nicotine, heroin, cocaine, or 
alcohol.122 But a 10 percent risk of dependency is far from 
trivial for anyone, and knowingly accepting a 50 percent risk 
of dependency—a mere coin flip—would legally be deemed 
reckless behavior.123 The risk to society from cannabis 
 
in six for young people who initiate in adolescence”); id. at 31–39 (describing 
studies investigating the risk that adolescent marijuana use could adversely 
affect learning, result in a greater drop-out rate, be a prelude to other drug use, 
or lead to schizophrenia or depression); Janni Leung et al., What Is the Prevalence 
and Risk of Cannabis Use Disorders among People Who Use Cannabis? A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 109 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 106479 (2020) (the 
risk of dependence is 33 percent among young people who engaged in regular 
(weekly or daily) cannabis use); Volkow et al., supra note 8, at 2220 tbl.1 (noting 
that negative effects in brain development, educational outcome, cognitive 
impairment, and life satisfaction are “strongly associated with initial marijuana 
use early in adolescence”). See generally Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 
325–31, 326 nn.30–40 (collecting authorities).  Studies have found that a range 
of 30-84% of juveniles seeking treatment for cannabis dependence have suffered 
from withdrawal.  Greene & Kelly, supra note 115, at 361–62, 366. 
 121. See, e.g., Jill B. Becker & Elena Chartoff, Sex Differences in Neural 
Mechanisms Mediating Reward and Addiction, 44 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
166, 166 (2019). 
 122. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 267 (noting that studies have found 
the approximate figures of addiction for various commonly used drugs is the 
following: of the people who smoke, 32% become addicted; for heroin, 23%; for 
cocaine, 17%; for alcohol, 10-15%; for marijuana, 9%); ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, 
at 25; Anthony et al., supra note 118, at 251 tbl.2 (noting comparative addiction 
rates of 32% for nicotine, 23% for heroin, 17% for cocaine, 15% for alcohol, 11% 
for stimulants, and 9% for cannabis); KEVIN P. HILL, MARIJUANA: THE UNBIASED 
TRUTH ABOUT THE WORLD’S MOST POPULAR WEED 37 (2015) (“Put simply, this data 
tells us that most people who begin using marijuana will not become addicted, 
but some will.  And adolescents are about twice as likely as adults to become 
addicted.”); id. at 36–37, 55–63. The recent increase in the potency of cannabis, 
see supra note 7, however, might push up the percentage of addicted users. 
 123. See, e.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016) (stating 
that to act recklessly is to “‘consciously disregard[]’ a substantial risk that the 
conduct will cause harm to another” (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. 
L. INST. 1962))); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (“The civil law 
generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails 
to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so 
obvious that it should be known.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 
1962) (defining “recklessness” for purposes of the General Requirements of 
Culpability: “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an 
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dependency is also considerable. Marijuana is the most 
widely available and used illicit drug.124 As such, even a one-
in-ten chance of becoming dependent, let alone a 50-50 
chance, means that a sizeable number of people will likely 
suffer from that condition.125 
The risk of dependence puts marijuana in the same 
category of consumer goods as alcohol and tobacco, items 
sometimes called “temptation goods.”126 Society might be 
 
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor’s situation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. L. INST. 
1965) (defining “reckless disregard of safety”: “The actor’s conduct is in reckless 
disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an 
act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of 
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk 
is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct 
negligent.”); id. § 500 cmt. a (“[Recklessness] must involve an easily perceptible 
danger of death of serious physical harm, and the probability that it will so result 
must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence.”); id. § 502 
(“The factors which determine when the conduct of an actor is in reckless 
disregard of another’s safety are applicable to determine whether the actor’s 
conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety.”); PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 34, at 213–14 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
 124. See, e.g., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2019 NAT’L DRUG 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 77 (2019) (“As the most commonly used illicit drug . . ., 
marijuana is widely available and cultivated in all 50 states.”); ROOM ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 25 (“Community mental health surveys indicate that in many 
developed societies cannabis dependence is the most common type of drug 
dependence after alcohol and tobacco.”). 
 125. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 25 (“The self-report 
data suggest that 2.8 million Americans met clinical criteria for marijuana 
dependence in 2013, and another 1.3 million met the criteria for abuse, for a total 
of 4.1 million meeting the criteria for abuse or dependence. (That’s 1.6 percent of 
the population aged 12 and older.) Estimates from Europe and Australia also find 
rates of marijuana abuse and dependence in the general population between 1 
percent and 2 percent.”). Fortunately, the prevalence of dependence might not be 
increasing. See Wilson M. Compton et al., Cannabis Use Disorders Among Adults 
in the United States During a Time of Increasing Use of Cannabis,  204 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 107468 (2019). 
 126. Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 33. 
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forced to “tolerate grudgingly” their sale because the cost of 
trying to prevent people from using them by deeming them 
contraband eclipses any realistically obtainable benefits 
from making the effort.127 Yet, given the potential for 
addiction and other harms associated with their use, society 
is under no obligation to embrace them or make it easy to 
purchase them. On the contrary, society is justified in 
discouraging their use. If a jurisdiction decides to make a 
purchaser jump through a few additional hoops not present 
when purchasing, say, an iPhone to avoid impulsive or 
whimsical purchases, there is no serious infringement on 
individual liberty. 
There is an important, related feature of that problem. 
Commercialization of cannabis has increased the number of 
marijuana users.128 Cannabis users, however, do not all 
consume the same quantity of that drug. The evidence 
indicates that a small number of users consume the vast 
amount of marijuana.129 For example, a university study of 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15, at 28 (“As policy 
liberalized, cannabis transformed from a weekend party drug to a daily habit, 
becoming more like tobacco smoking and less like drinking. The number of 
Americans who self-report using cannabis daily or near-daily grew from 0.9 
million in 1992 to 7.9 million in 2016.”); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, 
supra note 16, at 76–77 (“Over the past quarter-century, the population of 
‘current’ (past-month) users has more than doubled (to 22 million) and the 
fraction of those users who report daily or near-daily use has more than tripled 
(to about 35%). Those daily or near-daily users account for about 80% of the total 
cannabis consumed. Between a third and a half of them report the symptoms of 
Cannabis Use Disorder: They’re using more, or more frequently, than they 
intended to; they’ve tied to cut back or quit and failed; cannabis use is interfering 
with their other interests and responsibilities; and it’s causing conflict with 
people they care about.”). A major cause of increased marijuana use is 
commercialization. See Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15, at 28 (“use in 
Colorado rose not when its medical-marijuana law passed in 2000, but when 
dispensaries proliferated in 2009”); Andrew A. Monte et al., The Implications of 
Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 313 JAMA 241, 241 (2015). 
 129. See, e.g., OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N, 2019 RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND LEGIS. REP. 18 (2019); Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra 
note 16, at 28; MARIJUANA POL’Y GRP., LEEDS SCH. OF BUS., UNIV. OF COLO. 
BOULDER, MARKET SIZE AND DEMAND FOR MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: 2017 MARKET 
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2016 data in Colorado prepared for the Colorado Department 
of Revenue revealed that 22.5 percent of marijuana users 
consumed 71.7 percent of all the cannabis used during that 
year.130 A 2019 report by the state of Oregon reached the 
same conclusion.131 Two experts on the subject of cannabis 
found that the evidence points to a similar ratio. As the late 
NYU Professor Mark Kleiman explained, “Cannabis 
consumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the so-called 
80/20 rule (sometimes called ‘Pareto’s Law’): 20 percent of 
the users account for 80 percent of the volume.”132 Professor 
Caulkins made the same point from another direction. 
“[D]aily users are thought to consume (on average) the 
equivalent of three to four joints per day.”133 When 
marijuana consumption is measured on a total days-per-use 
basis, those daily users amount to “45% of the reported days 
of use and more than 50% of the weight consumed.”134 As the 
 
UPDATE 12 tbl.1 (2018) [hereinafter 2017 MPG MARKET UPDATE]; CAULKINS ET AL., 
MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 29; BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND CORP., BEFORE THE 
GRAND OPENING: MEASURING WASHINGTON STATE’S MARIJUANA MARKET IN THE 
LAST YEAR BEFORE LEGALIZED COMMERCIAL SALES 8 (2013) (“[T]he highest 
frequency users (those consuming on 21 days or more per month) utterly 
dominate the quantity consumed, accounting for close to 80 percent of total 
consumption.”); MILES K. LIGHT ET AL., COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MARKET SIZE AND 
DEMAND FOR MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 2–4, 2 tbl.1.1, 11–12 (2014) (hereinafter 
2014 MPG REPORT]; Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93. See generally OFF. 
OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: 
2000-2010, at 103 (2014) (“Total consumption and expenditures [on drugs] are 
driven by the minority of very heavy users who consume on 21 or more days each 
month.”). 
 130. See 2017 MPG MARKET UPDATE, supra note 129, at 12 tbl.1. The same 
group reached a similar conclusion in 2014. See 2014 MPG REPORT, supra note 
129.  
 131. See OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N, supra note 129, at 18 (“Like many 
markets, including for alcohol, total consumption is overwhelmingly driven by 
the heaviest users through the ‘80/20 rule.’ Generally, 20% of users represent 
80% of total consumption.”). 
 132. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93; see also, e.g., Rosalie L. Pacula 
et al., Assessing the Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana Use: The 
Devil is in the Details, 34 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 7 (2015). 
 133. Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 29. 
 134. Id. 
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result, “it seems literally true that the average gram of 
marijuana is consumed by someone who is under the 
influence of marijuana more than half of all their waking 
hours.”135   
Those harms are not hypothetical. The marijuana 
business pulls in approximately $50 billion in sales each 
year.136 That spells trouble. As Professor Kleiman warned us, 
“The cannabis industry, like the alcohol industry, depends on 
people using more of the product than is good for them.”137 
Professor Caulkins agrees. In his words, “from the 
perspective of cannabis vendors, drug abuse isn’t the 
problem; it’s the target demographic.”138 
Cannabis dependency harms users, but it also can make 
third parties suffer its consequences if users drive while 
under its influence.139 THC impairs a person’s ability to 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 16, at 78. 
 137. Id. at 83. 
 138. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93 (“Since we can expect the legal 
cannabis industry to be financially dependent on dependent consumers, we can 
also expect that the industry’s marketing practices and lobbying agenda will be 
dedicated to creating and sustaining problem drug use patterns.”).   
 139. See, e.g., Robert L. DuPont et al., Marijuana-Impaired Driving: A Path 
Through the Controversies, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, 
supra note 5, at 183, 186 (“Today there is a wealth of evidence that marijuana is 
an impairing substance that affects skills necessary for safe driving.”); Wayne 
Hall, What Has Research Over the Past Two Decades Revealed About the Adverse 
Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19, 21 (2014); 
Rebecca L. Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills, 
59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); Russell S. Kamer et al., Change in Traffic 
Fatality Rates in the First 4 States to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 180 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1119, 1120 (2020) (“[L]egalization of recreational marijuana is 
associated with increased traffic fatality rates. Applying these results to national 
driving statistics, nationwide legalization would be associated with 6800 (95% CI, 
4200-9700) excess roadway deaths each year.”); Johannes G. Ramaekers, Driving 
Under the Influence of Cannabis: An Increasing Public Health Concern, 319 
JAMA 1433 (2018). See generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 473–
78, 473 nn.87–103 (collecting studies). What is particularly disturbing is the large 
number of drivers who see no harm from “driving while stoned.” See Larkin, 
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 138–39, 139 n.155. A recent Colorado 
Department of Transportation report confirms that attitude among many 
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handle a motor vehicle safely if for no reason other than it 
impairs his or her ability to process information and make 
decisions quickly.140 That is particularly true if someone 
consumes marijuana together with alcohol, which people 
often do,141 because each drug amplifies the effect of the 
 
Colorado drivers. See COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE CANNABIS CONVERSATION 5 
(2020); see also MARY K. STOHR ET AL., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, EFFECTS OF 
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIME: FINAL REPORT 6–7, 
20 (2020) (noting that legalization in Washington State has resulted in “increased 
drugged driving”); Thomas R. Arkell et al., Driving-Related Behaviours, Attitudes 
and Perceptions Among Australian Medical Cannabis Users: Results from the 
CAMS 18-19 Survey, ACCID. ANALYSIS & PREV. 105784 (2020) (“A key finding of 
the current study is that a substantial proportion of medical cannabis users are 
driving shortly after using cannabis, with some driving during the time of peak 
effects when impairment tends to be greatest. More than 19.0% of users 
report[ed] driving within one hour of consuming cannabis and 34.6% of all users 
within 3 hours of use . . . . The finding that 71.9% of respondents felt that their 
medical cannabis use does not impair their driving is consistent with previous 
reports showing that cannabis users tend to perceive DUIC [Driving Under the 
Influence of Cannabis] as relatively low risk, especially when compared with 
alcohol.”). But see id. (“In a recent review, Celius et al. found that most patients 
with multiple sclerosis-related spasticity who were being treated with nabiximols 
actually showed an improvement in driving ability, most likely due to a reduction 
in spasticity and/or improved cognitive function.”). 
 140. See, e.g., BRIT. MED. ASS’N, THERAPEUTIC USES OF CANNABIS 66 (1997) 
[hereinafter BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS] (“Impairment of 
psychomotor and cognitive performance, especially in complex tasks, has been 
shown in normal subjects in many tests. Impairments include slowed reaction 
time, short-term memory deficits, impaired attention, time and space distortion, 
and impaired coordination. These effects combine with the sedative effects to 
cause deleterious effects on driving ability or operation of machinery.” (citations 
omitted)); see also, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. REP., supra note 20, at 85–99, 230; NAT’L 
INST., Marijuana, supra note 21. See generally Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, 
supra note 10. 
 141. See, e.g., Alejandro Azofeifa et al., Driving Under the Influence of 
Marijuana and Illicit Drugs Among Persons Aged ≥16 Years—United States, 
2018, MORBID. & MORTAL. WKLY. REP. (Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prev., Atlanta, 
Ga.), Dec. 20, 2019, at 1153, 1154 (“In a study of injured drivers aged 16–20 years 
evaluated at level 1 trauma centers in Arizona during 2008–2014, 10% of tested 
drivers were simultaneously positive for both alcohol and [THC.]” (footnote 
omitted)); BECKY BUI & JACK K. REED, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL: A REPORT PURSUANT TO HOUSE 
BILL 17-1315 7 (2018) (noting that in 2016 alcohol and THC were the most 
common drug combination in cases with test results); DARRIN T. GRONDEL ET AL., 
WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM’N, MARIJUANA USE, ALCOHOL USE, AND DRIVING IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 1-2 (2018) (“Poly-drug drivers (combinations of alcohol and 
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other.142 A THC-alcohol cocktail can disable someone from 
being able to drive safely even if neither drug alone would do 
so.143 Even short-term or occasional cannabis use poses 
 
drugs or multiple drugs) is now the most common type of impairment among 
drivers in fatal crashes. . . . The most common substance in poly-drug drivers is 
alcohol, followed by THC. . . . Since 2012, the number of poly-drug drivers 
involved in fatal crashes [has] increased an average of 15 percent every year . . . . 
By 2016, the number of poly-drug drivers [was] more than double the number of 
alcohol-only drivers and five times higher than the number of THC-only drivers 
involved in fatal crashes.”); 6 ROCKY MTN. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING 
AREA STRATEGIC INTEL. UNIT, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE 
IMPACT 10 (2019) (chart depicting that 46% of the drivers who tested positive for 
marijuana also had used alcohol and that 40% of marijuana users also used 
alcohol and another drug) [hereinafter ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT]; 
CAULKINS ET AL., INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 44 (“Marijuana users are much more 
likely than are nonusers to drink and to abuse alcohol. For example, current 
marijuana users are five times as likely as nonusers to meet DSM-IV criteria for 
alcohol abuse or dependence (26 percent versus 5 percent); that is, one in four 
current marijuana users is a problem drinker (calculated using 2012 NSDUH 
data using the SAMHSA online tool). . . .  The national household survey asks 
people what, if any, other substances they used the last time they drank alcohol. 
Among the 15.4 million people who used both alcohol and marijuana at some time 
in the past 30 days, 54 percent reported using marijuana along with alcohol the 
last time they drank, a proportion that rises to 83 percent among daily or near-
daily marijuana users.” (footnote omitted)); ROBERT L. DUPONT, INST. FOR BEHAV. 
& HEALTH, IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MARIJUANA DUID LAWS TO IMPROVE HIGHWAY 
SAFETY (2016). See generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 478–79, 
478 nn.104–07. The number of THC and alcohol users noted in studies is likely 
low because the police often do not drug test a driver arrested for DUI, since 
testing is costly and a positive test result would not increase the punishment. 
See, e.g., ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra, at 14. 
 142. See, e.g., BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS, supra note 140, at 73 
(noting the “additive effect” when marijuana and alcohol are combined); IVERSEN, 
supra note 17, at 96 (“It may be that the greatest risk of marijuana in this context 
is to amplify the impairment caused by alcohol when, as often happens, both 
drugs are taken together . . . .”); R. Andrew Sewell et al., The Effect of Cannabis 
Compared with Alcohol on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009). See generally 
Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 478–80, 479 nn.105–08 (collecting 
authorities). 
 143. See, e.g., Stanford Chihuri et al., Interaction of Marijuana and Alcohol on 
Fatal Motor Vehicle Crash Risk: A Case-Control Study, 4 INJURY EPIDEMIOLOGY 8 
(2017); Guohua Li et al., Role of Alcohol and Marijuana Use in the Initiation of 
Fatal Two-Vehicle Crashes, 27 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 342 (2017). But see 
Julian Santaella-Tenorio et al., US Traffic Fatalities, 1985-2014, and Their 
Relationship to Medical Marijuana Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 336 (2017) 
(finding a decrease in traffic fatalities in states with medical marijuana 
programs). 
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serious societal risks if someone “drives while high,” and it is 
likely that someone who is dependent on cannabis will often 
do so. For reasons such as these, the federal government has 
found that driving under the influence of cannabis is a major 
public health problem.144  
 
 144. See, e.g., OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY 23 (2010) (concluding that, because drug-impaired driving poses a 
threat to public safety similar to the one resulting from alcohol-impaired driving, 
the nation should undertake “a response on a level equivalent to the highly 
successful effort to prevent drunk driving”); Drugged Driving, DRUGFACTS (Nat’l 
Inst. on Drug Abuse, Bethesda, Md.), Nov. 2013, at 2 (“Considerable evidence 
from both real and simulated driving studies indicates that marijuana can 
negatively affect a driver’s attentiveness, perception of time and speed, and 
ability to draw on information obtained from past experiences.”); see also, e.g., 5 
ROCKY MTN. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA STRATEGIC INTEL. UNIT, 
THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 5–17 (Supp. 2019); 
BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS, supra note 140, at 66 (“Impairment of 
psychomotor and cognitive performance, especially in complex tasks, has been 
shown in normal subjects in many tests. Impairments include slowed reaction 
time, short-term memory deficits, impaired attention, time and space distortion, 
and impaired coordination. These effects combine with the sedative effects to 
cause deleterious effects on driving ability or operation of machinery.” (citations 
omitted)); ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 18–19 (“Better-controlled epidemiological 
studies have recently provided credible evidence that cannabis users who drive 
while intoxicated are at increased risk of motor vehicle crashes.”); D. Mark 
Anderson et al., Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol 
Consumption, 56 J. L. & ECON. 333 (2013); DuPont et al., in CONTEMPORARY 
HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 186 (“Today there is a wealth of 
evidence that marijuana is an impairing substance that affects skills necessary 
for safe driving.”); Rebecca L. Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects 
on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The 
Problem of “Driving While Stoned” Demands an Aggressive Public Policy 
Response, J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS, 2018, at 1; Ed Wood, Skydiving Without a 
Parachute, 4 J. ADDICTION MED. & THERAPY 1020 (2016). See generally Larkin, 
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 135–37, 135 nn.145–51 (collecting 
studies). There are other potential harms from smoking cannabis. For a sample, 
see Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 323–31; Zara Latif & Nadish 
Garg, The Impact of Marijuana on the Cardiovascular System: A Review of the 
Most Common Cardiovascular Events Associated with Marijuana Use, 9 J. 
CLINICAL MED. 1925, 1936 (2020) (“Although it is widely viewed as a safe drug, 
marijuana has been strongly linked to various cardiovascular adverse events over 
the years. Many cases have linked marijuana to myocardial infarction, especially 
in young healthy men with no other risk factors. Marijuana has also been 
associated with a worse mortality rate post MI [myocardial infarction, or heart 
attack]. Cases of marijuana precipitating arrhythmias, stress cardiomyopathy, 
and arteritis have all been described. With the rise in cannabis use among older 
patients, who are the most vulnerable to cardiovascular events, it is expected that 
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We cannot rely on the market to prevent those problems. 
On the contrary, firms in the cannabis industry have every 
incentive to see an increase in the number of casual users.145 
The incentive is even stronger to create as many heavy users 
as possible. As Professor Kleiman cleverly put it, the 
cannabis industry is “financially dependent on dependent 
consumers.”146 Accordingly, just as the tobacco industry did 
for most of the twentieth century, the cannabis industry will 
devote its marketing practices toward increasing the number 
of heavy, long-term users, because those people are the 
primary source of its revenue.147 Increasing the number of 
 
these reports will increase in the next few years.”); Nora D. Volkow, Marijuana 
and Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based Approach, in 2 PROFESSIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION MEDICINE 23, 28 (Mark Stanford & Donald Avoy eds., 
2009) (“Marijuana is not a benign drug. It is illegal and has significant adverse 
health and social consequences associated with its use.”).   
 145. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 31 (“‘Drug policy is all about reducing 
demand, and a company that has a profit motive is only going to increase 
demand,’ [former Marijuana Policy Project lobbyist Don] Riffle said. ‘Having a big 
commercial marijuana industry runs counter to public health goals.’”); Kamin, 
Legal Cannabis, supra note 16, at 652 (“The downside of a free market model, of 
course, is the lack of restraint on the profit motive. In an unregulated market, 
there will be no check on the desire of businesses to increase profits at the expense 
of customers. The profit motive will drive businesses to develop new products and 
cultivate new consumers by targeting new users.”). 
 146. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93. 
 147. Id.; see also, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 58 (“Any businessman would want 
in on marijuana. It is a legal drug, and a legal drug is a gold mine. If it is 
addictive, it creates a compulsion to purchase. As we learned from the tobacco 
hearings of the 1990s, not all businessmen can resist exploiting their customers’ 
compulsions. The National Institute on Drug Abuse says marijuana ‘can’ be 
addictive. But even if a drug is merely ‘habit forming,’ as many doctors believe 
marijuana to be, it creates an unlevel playing field between seller and consumer. 
The more ‘efficient’ the market, the more powerful this inequality. . . . But 
corporations bring to the fore questions of size, power and accountability. Do we 
want multinational businesses using vast marketing budgets and gifted creative 
teams to teach our children that smoking a lot of pot is somehow sexy, or manly, 
or sophisticated? Do we want labs to come up with new flavors and varieties that 
turn pot-smoking into an adventure in connoisseurship and a way of demarcating 
oneself by class? Would we be content with a Microsoft of marijuana?”); Kamin, 
Legal Cannabis, supra note 16, at 652 (“[A]s with the tobacco and alcohol 
industries, there is reason to be concerned that a commercial marijuana industry 
will seek to profit from the heavy users who account for the overwhelming 
majority of marijuana consumed.”). 
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cannabis-dependent people, however, is not a sensible public 
health approach to cannabis legalization. In fact, it is 
difficult to find a public policy field where addiction is 
regarded as a social benefit.148  
Traditional forms of regulation, like the ones used in 
Colorado and elsewhere, do not address those problems.149 
Rules governing a product’s price and quality are designed to 
protect consumers against monopoly pricing and unsafe 
goods. Those rules do not address improvident decisions by 
users and externalities imposed on unwilling third parties. 
The rules assume that consumers can make sensible choices 
and leave to them the responsibility to decide whether a 
particular widget will generate more benefits than harms. 
They also operate against the background assumption that 
the tort system will provide a remedy for any injuries caused 
to third parties in an efficient manner. Those assumptions, 
however, are misplaced when the product is both addictive 
and potentially harmful to users and others. Persons who 
become addicted to a substance have lost most, if not all, of 
their ability to make a rational choice whether to consume it. 
That loss, after all, is a defining feature of an addiction.150 
 
 148. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 591 (“While caution is indicated, legalizing 
states are ignoring the lessons of history by creating a commercial market with 
vested interests in promoting increased consumption and aggressive advertising 
that inevitably encourages youthful use. This is the wrong path. A cautious 
approach would gradually open the regulatory spigot while carefully monitoring 
the consequences of doing so. Proper public health surveillance mechanisms must 
be in place from the beginning so that the effects of different regulatory choices 
can be measured.”). 
 149. See Kamin, Colorado’s Regulation, supra note 109, at 226 (describing 
Colorado’s regulatory approach as “a market-based licensing scheme that has 
served as a model for other states and nations around the world.”); id. at 226–27 
(“While other states have capped either the number of marijuana businesses that 
will be authorized or the total amount of marijuana they will be permitted to 
produce, Colorado did neither. Rather, it created a compulsory licensing and 
tiered-production system that would allow supply and demand to determine how 
much marijuana would be produced by how many entities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 150. See ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 28–32 (“Chemical dependence is 
compulsive, pathological, impaired control over drug use, leading to an inability 
to stop using drugs in spite of adverse consequences.”). 
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Moreover, users can decide whether to drive after smoking 
marijuana, but no one can make that decision for someone 
else. Every day during rush hour we see proof of the 
proposition that “No man is an island.” John Stuart Mill did 
not live in the age of motor vehicles, so his libertarian 
philosophy does not make sense in a world where they have 
become a necessity despite their potential to maim or kill—
and that happens all too often when a driver is under the 
influence of an impairing drug like THC.  
* * * * * 
The result is this: Cannabis is not an unadulterated 
good. Heavy, long-term, and widespread cannabis use has 
the potential to exceed any potential benefits that its 
euphoria-inducing cannabinoid might have. Most regulatory 
restrictions do not directly address those problems. Yet, 
there are two other forms of supply-side regulation that 
might: state ownership of wholesale or retail cannabis 
distribution facilities and advertising bans. The next section 
discusses their utility. 
2. A Response: State Ownership of Retail Cannabis 
Stores 
One alternative to large-scale commercialization would 
be to permit only individuals to grow and possess a limited 
amount of marijuana for personal use. Vermont uses that 
system. That option might work in largely rural areas, like 
Montana, but would not in large cities, such as Chicago, or 
in their components, such as Queens, New York City, where 
there are no large unoccupied areas open for agricultural 
use. Some other cultivation and distribution system would be 
necessary there.  
Another approach would be to limit wholesale or retail 
sales to not-for-profit organizations. Professor Caulkins has 
endorsed that option.151 It has the advantage of using for 
 
 151. See Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 33 (“There are many 
ways of putting that [harm-avoidance or -reduction] philosophy into practice. One 
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distribution organizations that do not have profit 
maximization as their raison d’être. That reduces the risk 
that the competitive spirit of their owners and operators will 
seek to addict as many people as possible by persuading non-
users to become occasional users and occasional users to 
become heavy users.152 Unfortunately, however, not-for-
profit entities might not enforce restraints on sales to minors 
as strictly as the state might desire, because of the lost 
revenue involved in rigorous enforcement. Moreover, as 
discussed below, a state should ban cannabis advertising by 
wholesale or retail stores to reduce purchases, but a state 
might not be able to prevent a private enterprise, whether 
for-profit or not-for-profit, from advertising the sale of 
cannabis, given the First Amendment Free Speech Clause 
issues that any advertising ban would raise.153 
A third option, as a 2015 RAND Corporation report has 
identified, is to restrict distribution to state-owned cannabis 
stores.154 The Twenty-First Amendment gives states that 
 
way is to start by restricting production and distribution to non-profits or for-
benefit corporations whose charters mandate that they merely meet existing 
demand, not pursue unfettered market growth to maximize shareholders’ returns 
and owners’ wealth.  It would also be wise to require these organizations’ boards 
to be dominated by public health and child-welfare advocates.”). 
 152. Placing regulatory responsibility in the hands of public health agencies 
rather than state revenue departments would also help avoid encouraging 
overuse as a revenue-generating opportunity.   
 153. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding 
unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting the advertising of certain compounded 
drugs); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding 
unconstitutional state restrictions on the advertising of cigars and smokeless 
tobacco); Greater New Orleans Broadcast. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 
(1999) (holding unconstitutional a federal ban on casino gambling in a state 
where it was a lawful activity); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 
(1996) (holding unconstitutional a state ban on accurate information about the 
retail prices of alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 
(1995) (holding unconstitutional a federal ban on the alcoholic content of 
beverages); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and 
Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1081 (2017). 
 154. See CAULKINS ET AL., INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 60–64; see also Unlocked 
Potential: Small Businesses in the Cannabis Industry, Hearing Before the House 
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authority to control the distribution of alcohol within their 
jurisdictions.155 Exercising that authority, states regulate 
the sale of wine, beer, and distilled spirits in numerous 
ways.156 For example, some states allow only wine and beer 
to be sold at grocery or convenience stores, with the sale of 
distilled spirits limited to separate liquor stores. Some states 
prohibit the sale of alcohol on Sunday. More than a dozen 
states, however, have decided to own and operate or contract 
the wholesale or retail distribution facilities for alcohol.157 
 
Small Business Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
recommending state ownership). That would include in-state brick-and-mortar 
stores, online stores, and delivery services (e.g., a Grubhub for marijuana). 
Additional options that are a variant of the three mentioned above include (1) 
limiting distribution to members of small co-operatives or buyers’ clubs; (2) 
permitting locally controlled retail sales without legalizing large-scale 
commercial production (the “Dutch coffee-shop model”); and (3) having very few 
closely monitored for-profit licensees. Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Options and 
Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization, PERSP. (RAND Corp., Santa Monica, 
Cal.), 2015, at 1, 4. 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Paul Byrne & Dmitri Nizovtsev, Exploring the Effects of State 
Differences in Alcohol Retain Restrictions, 50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 16 (2017) 
(“States currently regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages under two general 
systems: a control system or a licensure system. Generally, when a state directly 
controls the pricing of some types of alcoholic beverages—through operating state 
stores, regulating agency stores, or directly setting the retail price—such a state 
is considered a ‘control’ or ‘monopoly’ state. When a state government indirectly 
controls the sale and distribution of alcohol through licensing of privately owned 
establishments, it is considered a ‘licensure’ or ‘privatized’ state. Currently in the 
United States most states operate under a licensure system. However, 18 states 
maintain some direct control over certain sectors of the alcoholic beverage 
market. . . . Among the licensure states, retail restrictions also vary significantly. 
Some states have few restrictions whereas others have restrictions on the days 
and hours of alcohol sales or the type of establishments through which alcohol 
can be sold to consumers. In the most restrictive states, all alcoholic beverages 
must be sold at licensed retail liquor stores. There are also states in which such 
limitations apply to stronger alcoholic beverages whereas beverages with lower 
alcohol content can be sold at a wide range of establishments. The line between 
the beverage groups can differ by state but in all cases restrictions (or absence 
thereof) are tied to the alcohol content.”). 
 157. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 28-3-1 to 28-3-75 (2020); Idaho Liquor Act, IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-101 to 23-312 (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.1 to 123.37 
(West 2020); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 451-461 (West 2020); MICH. 
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Some own the facilities or contract them out only for distilled 
spirits or for alcohol above a certain potency. Other states 
have different approaches for wholesale and retail sales 
(New Hampshire) or have different systems in different 
counties (Maryland).  
States should adopt a state ownership model as part of 
any legalization program. Limiting distribution to state 
businesses carries a lower risk of overall societal harm. If the 
demand for cannabis resembles the demand for alcohol or 
tobacco—remember: alcohol, nicotine, and THC are all 
potentially addictive substances—there will always be a 
demand for that product. If the marijuana industry grows in 
the same way that the tobacco industry did, over time a small 
number of very large companies will distribute the vast 
majority of the product.158 The new industry is likely to 
generate substantial profits, which would translate into 
enormous political power.159 Once it has secured the 
legalized commerce of marijuana, the industry would fight 
tooth-and-nail to maintain its profits and influence. Witness 
how the tobacco industry fought regulation of tobacco by the 
Food and Drug Administration for decades. Allowing 
 
CONST. art. IV, § 40 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2020 amendments); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.1204 to 436.1205, 436.1209, 436.1211 (West 2020); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-3, 67-1-5(i), (j) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (West 
2020) (defining “Alcohol,” “Alcoholic beverages,” “Beer,” “Spirits,” and “Wine”); id. 
§ 4.1-101 (creating the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority); id. § 4.1-
103 (empowering the Board of Directors of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Authority to sell distilled spirits). See generally Control State Directory 
and Info, NAT’L ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, 
https://www.nabca.org/control-state-directory-and-info (last visited Mar. 16, 
2021). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 58 and 67–71. 
 159. See Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93 (recommending state 
ownership as one option: “As more and more states begin to legalize marijuana 
over the next few years, the cannabis industry will begin to get richer—and that 
means it will start to wield considerably more political power, not only over the 
states but over national policy, too. That’s how we could get locked into a bad 
system in which the primary downside of legalizing pot—increased drug abuse, 
especially by minors—will be greater than it needs to be, and the benefits, 
including tax revenues, smaller than they could be.”); Larkin, Gummy Bears, 
supra note 9, at 355–56, 355 nn.99–100. 
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nationwide commercialization of marijuana might generate 
considerable harms but prove to be politically irreversible.  
We generally do not approve, let alone applaud, policies 
or practices that worsen the lives of a large percentage of the 
people who undertake them. Few members of Congress 
would be willing to appear at a town hall meeting and tell 
their constituents that, if cannabis is legalized, one of every 
ten will use marijuana on a regular basis and that one of 
every ten children who start using it as adolescents will 
become addicted or suffer some form of mental illness.160 
Nonetheless, if Congress were to legalize marijuana use in 
one way or another—for example, by deleting it from the CSA 
generally or in those states that permit it to be used 
recreationally—Congress would need to decide if marijuana 
should be treated in the same manner as other consumer 
goods.161 
It might seem odd for a state to consider turning its back 
on private ownership of any commodity. Since our colonial 
period, the nation has had a capitalist economy that 
protected the right to own and operate the machinery of 
commerce.162 Yet, the nation has never been committed to a 
purely laissez-faire approach to economic governance.163 As 
noted above, governments have traditionally justified 
legislative interference in commerce on the ground that 
 
 160. See Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 326–31, 326 nn.30–40. 
 161. Removing cannabis from Schedule I of the CSA, or deleting it from the 
CSA entirely, would not eliminate all federal regulation of THC. THC is a drug 
and therefore would remain subject to regulation by the FDA under the FDCA. 
See Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 115–27; Sean M. 
O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, 
Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019); Patricia J. Zettler, 
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845 (2017). 
 162. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1955); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE 
ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1789 (1985); EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE 
ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1988). See generally Larkin, Property, 
supra note 86, at 4–6, 21–54 (describing the understanding of “property” held by 
the Colonists and Framers). 
 163. See, e.g., BOURGIN, supra note 86. 
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market defects—such as natural monopolies or 
externalities—justify regulation. In those circumstances, 
governments establish administrative agencies to regulate a 
good or service rather than leave it to the market or tort 
system.164 
A state-run system has several additional advantages 
over a for-profit or not-for-profit system. State ownership of 
distribution stores would make it easier for a state to monitor 
marijuana sales (and employees) to prevent unauthorized 
distribution to minors and to the black market165 (which has 
not disappeared166). State ownership would help avoid the 
 
 164. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2084 
(establishing the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and empowering it 
to create safety standards and initiate recalls of products that present an 
unreasonable risk of injury or death); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (global ed., 4th ed. 2015). 
 165. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 591–92 (“States would be well-advised to 
think about alternatives to a commercialized marijuana market while they still 
have that opportunity. . . . In short, if we are going to legalize, it needs to be done 
in a way that protects the public health.  The right starting point is not the alcohol 
model. It is a non-commercialized ‘containment’ model.”); Benjamin M. Leff, Tax 
Benefits of Government-Owned Marijuana Stores, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 683 
(2016) (“Local governments may be in a better position than for-profit sellers to 
operate marijuana stores consistent with the public welfare, and several 
commentators, including some participants in this symposium, have advocated 
that at least some states should experiment with a government monopoly on 
marijuana sales.” (footnote omitted)). 
 166. See John Schroyer, California Marijuana Notebook: How Illicit Market 
Competition, Industry Divisiveness Hound the State’s Legal Cannabis Market, 
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://mjbizdaily.com/california-
marijuana-notebook-how-illicit-market-competition-industry-divisiveness-
hound-the-states-legal-cannabis-market/ (“It’s an open secret in the California 
marijuana industry that since the state launched licensed adult-use sales in 
2018, many – if not most – legal operators have done business illegally to some 
degree. And that’s still the case, according to Chris Coulombe, CEO of Sonoma-
based distributor Pacific Expeditors. ‘I have to imagine that 60% of the market 
overall is probably playing in parallel markets, but I don’t think they enjoy that. 
It’s truly a decision of necessity,’ Coulombe told Marijuana Business Daily.  ‘You 
have a lot of retailers that are selling knockoff products . . . and you have 
cultivators that are selling product out the backdoor so they can keep their 
business alive.’ As one source told MJBizDaily in early 2019: ‘Anybody who’s 
profitable still has at least one foot in the black market.’”); ARCVIEW MARKET 
RSCH. & BDS ANALYTICS, CALIFORNIA: THE WORLD’S LARGEST CANNABIS MARKET 
7-8, 10 (2019) (“A unique feature of the California market that contributed to 
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problems that arise whenever the law permits only one 
business form—such as not-for-profit concerns—to 
participate in an activity, even though the members of the 
industry prefer other forms—such as for-profit companies. 
Corporation law is largely within the bailiwick of the states 
to devise,167 and there is a risk that particular states might 
bend their laws to enable (if not encourage) parties to obscure 
the true ownership of a not-for-profit enterprise. That risk 
might be slight, but there is far less risk of such legal 
chicanery if the state itself must own the cannabis 
distribution business.168  
 
these dives in topline sales figures is the robust competition from the illicit 
market with which licensed retailers are forced to contend. Given the state’s 
lengthy history as the source for the bulk of the nation’s illicit cannabis, and the 
fact that many producers and retailers opted not to enter the regulated market 
due to compliance costs, Californian consumers have no shortage of cheap illicit 
sources for their cannabis. They rushed into dispensaries amid the hoopla of long-
awaited legalization and then quietly returned to traditional sources when they 
saw after-tax prices reflective of the 77% tax-and-regulatory load the legal 
market bears. . . . In an $11.3 billion total cannabis market of 2017, $8.3 billion 
was already being spent in extra-legal channels. For the first time anywhere, 
adult use legalization actually prompted growth in illicit sales in California in 
2018.”); Brooke Staggs, Legal? Illegal? Some Players Still Work Both Sides of State Marijuana 
Industry, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Mar. 15, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/03/15/legal-illegal-some-players-still-work-
both-sides-of-state-marijuana-industry/  (“The state’s illicit market—which has its 
roots in the medical marijuana market California created 21 years ago—is thriving, 
more profitable and roughly eight times bigger than the legal world.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 718 (2020) (“Corporations are 
generally ‘creatures of state law,’ and state law is well equipped to handle 
disputes involving corporate property rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83–89 
(1994). 
 168. State ownership also might not have the same banking problems that for-
profit and not-for-profit business would have with using the national banking 
system for receipts from the sale of marijuana. Banks that accept deposits from 
businesses selling marijuana in violation of the CSA would violate the federal 
money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957. States that have the 
same structure as the federal government—that is, states that have a state-
owned and -operated treasury—can deposit the proceeds into its treasury rather 
than use the interstate banking system. That might avoid the need for Congress 
to revise the banking laws to address the problems resulting from the operation 
of a large-scale cash business. The fewer statutes modified, the lesser the risk of 
unintended statutory consequences. 
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A second restriction is an advertising ban. Every 
legitimate business engages in price and quality advertising 
to persuade consumers that its product costs less and 
delivers more than its competitors.169 Companies in the 
cannabis industry generally do not. The U.S. Postal Service 
will not deliver marijuana ads, and the Federal 
Communications Commission has not approved radio or 
television advertising over the federally regulated 
airwaves.170 The major social media opportunities are also 
unavailable because (at present) Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram will not accept cannabis advertisements.171 State 
laws vary as to whether medical or recreational cannabis 
businesses can advertise. Some states prohibit advertising 
altogether. Others, such as Colorado, treat cannabis 
advertising like alcohol advertising. A third group, like New 
Mexico, has no rules on the subject.172 If cannabis retailing 
were left to private ownership, the cannabis industry would 
no doubt pressure the government (and major media 
companies) to lift any ban on advertising, and more 
advertising would mean more dependency. A state monopoly, 
by contrast, could easily maintain a ban on advertising. 
May a state monopolize the retail distribution of 
cannabis? Yes. No one has a constitutional right to distribute 
 
 169. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557 (2001) (“[W]e 
have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates demand for 
products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.”); 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495–96 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in 
colonial days, the public relied on ‘commercial speech’ for vital information about 
the market. Early newspapers displayed advertisements for goods and services 
on their front pages, and town criers called out prices in public squares. Indeed, 
commercial messages played such a central role in public life prior to the founding 
that Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of 
his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados.” 
(citations omitted)); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 567–68 (1980). 
 170. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 66. 
 171. See, e.g., id. at 67. 
 172. See, e.g., id. at 66–67. 
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or possess marijuana,173 and the CSA does not prohibit the 
states from changing their penal codes to legalize it for 
medical or recreational use.174 Accordingly, a state can 
choose to treat cannabis as contraband or allow it to be sold 
and owned but regulated.175 A state limitation on entry into 
a market is a form of regulation, even if the state grants itself 
the monopoly. In fact, numerous states use their Twenty-
First Amendment authority over alcohol distribution by 
owning or contracting out the retail sale of one or more types 
of intoxicating beverages.176 The reach of a state’s inherent 
police power over marijuana is at least as broad as its power 
 
 173. For examples of cases rejecting various claims that the federal or state 
bans on marijuana distribution or possession are unconstitutional see United 
States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547–48 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kiffer, 
477 F.2d 349, 352–57 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 
F.2d 1220, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 373–
76 (6th Cir. 1972); State v. Kells, 259 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 1977); State v. Leins, 
234 N.W.2d 645, 645–48 (Iowa 1975); State v. Donovan, 344 A.2d 401, 405–06 
(Me. 1975); Blincoe v. State, 204 S.E.2d 597, 599 (Ga. 1974); State v. Tabory, 196 
S.E.2d 111, 112–14 (S.C. 1973); State v. Parker, 256 A.2d 159 (N.H. 1969); 
Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969); People v. Stark, 400 P.2d 
923 (Colo. 1965). See also, e.g., Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 
(manuscript at 3, 3 n.17); cf. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917) (ruling that 
there is no federal constitutional right to possess or use alcohol). The Supreme 
Court has not squarely addressed the issue, but its decisions in related cases 
make the point. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587–
94 (1979) (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a city policy refusing 
to hire methadone users); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979) 
(rejecting the argument that there is an express or implied exception to the FDCA 
for drugs that can be used to treat the terminally ill); cf. Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 422–30 (1974) (rejecting due process and equal protection 
challenges to Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251–
55, which excludes repeat offenders from discretionary rehabilitative addiction 
treatment in lieu of incarceration). 
 174. See Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 110–11. 
 175. The principal federal statute protecting the economic benefits of a free 
market and interstate commerce—the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et 
seq.—permits the states to decide whether to adopt a laissez-faire approach to 
their local economies or regulate the cultivation and distribution of plants like 
cannabis. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“We find 
nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that 
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed 
by its legislature.”). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 130–33. 
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under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate alcohol.177 
Accordingly, a state clearly can monopolize the sale of 
cannabis. 
The next question logically follows from that one. Having 
legislated itself a monopoly over cannabis distribution, may 
a state decline to advertise its new consumer product? The 
answer again is, yes. Neither the Constitution nor any act of 
Congress requires any market participant, including a 
monopolist, to advertise its wares. On the contrary, a number 
of Supreme Court cases have placed restrictions on what 
speech the government may demand someone utter.178 To be 
sure, a state is not a “person” for constitutional purposes and 
therefore does not possess First Amendment free speech 
rights.179 Nonetheless, a state, like any other market 
participant, can decide not to advertise marijuana or any 
other item it sells. Moreover, a government, like a person, 
can decide what message to endorse or reject.180 That 
 
 177. Compare, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) 
(“According to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to 
embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”), with, e.g., 
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462–76 (2019) 
(describing a state’s Twenty-First Amendment regulatory authority). 
 178. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(ruling that the state cannot require a regulated energy utility to place a third-
party’s newsletter discussing electric power conservation in its billing envelopes); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977) (ruling that New Hampshire 
cannot force drivers to display the state’s motto of “Live Free or Die” on state-
owned motor vehicle license plates). 
 179. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966) (“The 
word ‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the 
States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any 
court.”). 
 180. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 
207 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause 
from determining the content of what it says.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government 
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”); Johanns 
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own 
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”); Bd. of Regents v. 
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decision is certainly a sensible one in the case of goods like 
tobacco, alcohol, or cannabis, for the reasons given above. If 
a state had to justify its decision, it could readily do so by 
arguing that its refusal to advertise might help prevent 
overuse of cannabis and reduce dependence and roadway 
crashes.181 
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
However a state chooses to regulate the cannabis 
industry, the conflict between state and federal law will 
remain unchanged unless and until Congress decides to 
revise the CSA or directs the Executive Branch to enforce it 
as it is currently written. There is a possibility, however, that 
Congress could decide to lift the CSA’s ban in states that 
have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use.182 
 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (a government entity has the right to 
“speak for itself.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and 
disfavor points of view . . . .”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.  of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (observing that a government entity “is entitled to 
say what it wishes”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from 
controlling its own expression.”). 
 181. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 593 (“If the legislature’s objective in 
repealing prohibition is to set up a regulatory policy that allows recreational use 
(or medical use for that matter) while seeking to contain it, then it would be 
illogical to permit private sellers to promote and encourage consumption. In my 
opinion, once commercialization is permitted, the public health costs will be 
difficult to contain. As already indicated, I believe that Washington and Colorado 
are making a huge mistake by starting with a private commercial model for 
cultivation and distribution. In my opinion, legislatures legalizing recreational 
use of marijuana should declare explicitly that the ultimate regulatory objective 
is to protect the public health, not to facilitate commerce in cannabis products (or 
to serve the economic interests of suppliers and retailers). Legalization should be 
designed to accommodate liberty, not to celebrate it. The policy aim should not be 
to promote or facilitate marijuana use (or even ‘responsible use’), but rather to 
manage lawful commerce in marijuana in a way that protects the public health.”). 
 182. I have argued elsewhere that, if Congress decides to revisit the CSA, it 
should make clear that the Food and Drug Administration is responsible for 
regulating botanical cannabis and any cannabinoids derived from it, regardless 
of whether and how the states permit marijuana to be used for medical purposes. 
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Members of Congress have introduced bills to achieve that 
result by amending the CSA or limiting the use of federal 
funds to enforce it.183 Congress, however, has not yet passed 
any of them. 
That impasse raises the final issue. Suppose Congress 
decides that a state retail-store ownership requirement and 
an advertising ban are sensible ways to accommodate a 
state’s desire to allow the sale of marijuana while also 
reducing cannabis dependency and promoting roadway 
safety. That is, imagine that Congress concludes that 
requiring the states to take those two steps is a reasonable 
compromise between the desire of some parties to see the 
issue of marijuana legalization altogether left to the states 
and the hope of other parties that Congress will direct the 
Executive Branch to enforce the CSA as written. If so, may 
Congress require a state to adopt one or both of those 
regulatory tools as a condition of exempting the state’s 
legalization program from the CSA? Does Congress have the 
constitutional authority to demand that a state accept those 
conditions to allow cannabis to be sold under whatever other 
rules it cares to impose? 
This scenario is a novel one. There is no precedent 
squarely on point, so resort to first principles is necessary. 
Some (if not all) states will certainly object to any such 
requirements on the ground that they trespass on state 
sovereignty, in violation of the Tenth Amendment.184 The 
state’s argument would go as follows:  
First, a state retail store-ownership requirement would 
 
See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25–30); Larkin, 
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 115–27. 
 183. See, e.g., Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting 
States Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (permitting the states to 
decide whether to legalize marijuana); State Cannabis Commerce Act, S. 2030, 
116th Cong. (2019) (preventing federal funds from being used to prevent the 
states from implementing cannabis legalization programs). 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
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intrude on a state’s authority to define its internal 
governmental structure. The Constitution divides the federal 
government into three branches, but that framework, and its 
underlying separation-of-powers principles, does not apply to 
the states.185 Each state enjoys the prerogative to define and 
structure its government in any way it sees fit as long as it 
retains a “Republican Form of Government,”186 which is no 
more threatened by allowing private enterprise to operate 
retail cannabis stores than by permitting private ownership 
of retail liquor stores.187 However much Congress might 
desire to reduce cannabis dependence and impairment, and 
however great those harms might be in a particular 
jurisdiction, Congress can no more demand that a state take 
ownership of marijuana than it can direct the states to take 
possession of radioactive waste, which the Supreme Court 
held in New York v. United States that Congress cannot do.188 
However much Congress might want the states to decide 
when, where, and how cannabis sales will be made, and 
however often private parties might be willing to look the 
other way when (for instance) a minor tries to purchase 
marijuana, Congress can no more impress state employees 
 
 185. See, for example, Mayor of Philadelphia v. Education Equality League, 
415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974), Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 
612 (1937), and Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902), all ruling that federal 
separation of powers principles do not bind the states. See also Highland Farms, 
300 U.S. at 612 (“How power shall be distributed by a state among its 
governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.”); 
Dreyer, 187 U.S. at 84 (“Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or 
collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some 
matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of 
government, is for the determination of the state.”); cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 
U.S. 559 (1911) (ruling that Congress cannot prohibit a state from moving the 
location of its capital as a condition of approving its entry into the union). 
 186. See U.S. CONST. art. IV (“The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 187. See Highland Farms, 300 U.S. at 612 (ruling that a state law delegating 
minimum price-setting authority to private parties does not violate the Guaranty 
Clause).  
 188. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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into that retail identification task than it could force state 
law enforcement officers to conduct firearms background 
checks, which the Court ruled in Printz v. United States that 
Congress also cannot do.189 To paraphrase Chief Justice 
Warren Burger’s opinion for the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Chadha, the fact that a congressionally required state 
cannabis retail-operation requirement is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in forestalling cannabis dependence 
or motor vehicle crashes, standing alone, will not save that 
law if it is contrary to the Constitution.190 
Second, an ownership requirement and advertising ban 
requirement impermissibly directs the state to adopt 
legislation that the state would prefer not to see become 
law.191 Congress has the power to pass legislation regulating 
interstate and intrastate commerce,192 along with the 
authority to create federal agencies to implement those 
laws.193 Congress cannot, however, direct states to adopt 
state law or to create their own administrative agencies. 
Accordingly, the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from 
putting the states to the choice between continued 
 
 189. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 190. 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). It is beyond the scope of this Article to decide 
whether only a state can make that argument or an entrepreneur can also do so. 
See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) (ruling that, in a criminal 
prosecution, the defendant has standing to claim that the statute underlying the 
charge violates the Tenth Amendment). 
 191. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) 
(applying the Anticommandeering Doctrine to hold that Congress cannot forbid 
a state from changing state law); New York, 505 U.S. at 155–69, 174–83 (ruling 
that Congress cannot force the states to accept either possession of radioactive 
waste or whatever rules the federal government adopts for its management). 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”). 
 193. The Constitution contemplates that Congress will create “executive 
Departments” filled by “Officers of the United States” who will assist the 
President with “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, §§ 2-3. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the 
authority to create an administrative state to assist the President perform his 
responsibilities. See infra note 196.  
2021] CANNABIS CAPITALISM 283 
application of the CSA as it stands today and adopting the 
requirements as the price for an exemption.  
The states’ argument is a reasonable one, but the 
response to it is compelling. The reason is that Congress has 
the authority to negotiate a “deal” with the states in which 
they agree to perform responsibilities that they would 
otherwise be free to decline. In that regard, Congress can 
condition the states’ receipt of federal benefits on their 
willingness to “cooperate” with the federal government to 
achieve a legitimate goal that is beyond Congress’s direct 
regulatory authority. In other words, Congress may put the 
states to the choice described above under its Spending 
Clause authority, even if not under its Commerce Clause 
power.  
Start by considering the latter. Congress lacks the 
inherent “police power” that states enjoy,194 but the 
Commerce Clause,195 buttressed by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause,196 authorizes Congress to regulate inter- and 
 
 194. Compare, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (“The 
authority of the state to enact this statute [viz., a smallpox vaccination 
requirement] is to be referred to what is commonly called the police power—a 
power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union 
under the Constitution. . . . According to settled principles, the police power of a 
state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established 
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public 
safety.”), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1924), with, e.g., 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“The Constitution . . . 
withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power . . . .”) and McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 317, 405 (“Th[e] [federal] government is 
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”). 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); see, 
e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-35 (2010); McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
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intrastate commerce in several ways.197 As relevant here, 
Congress may prohibit anyone from using the facilities of 
interstate commerce, including the interstate highway and 
the national banking systems,198 for the cultivation or 
distribution of cannabis. Congress may also prohibit the 
purely intrastate growth or sale of marijuana to prevent any 
spillover into interstate commerce. The Supreme Court 
expressly so held in Gonzales v. Raich,199 and it also rejected 
the argument that Congress cannot rely on the Commerce 
Clause to regulate the intrastate cannabis market if a state 
has its own regulatory program.200  
Occasionally, Congress’s exercise of its regulatory 
authority butts up against state preferences. When that 
happens, the states claim that the Tenth Amendment 
entitles them to go their own way. For the last 150 years, the 
Supreme Court has followed an erratic trajectory on the 
appropriate place of the states and role for the Tenth 
Amendment in constitutional law.201 On three recent 
 
constitution, are constitutional.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548-58 (2012) 
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 653–60 (opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–19 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–68 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Congress 
may regulate the “channels” and “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, as 
well as the goods transiting them, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59, including items 
that Congress believes are dangerous or “immoral.” See, e.g., Hoke v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (regarding prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United 
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (regarding impure food and drugs); Champion v. Ames 
(The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1901) (regarding lottery tickets and prize lists). 
Congress’s regulatory authority also reaches entirely intrastate activities that, 
considered individually or as a class, have “a substantial relation to” or 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; see also, e.g., 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–13; Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.  
 198. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (upholding Congress’s authority to 
create a national bank). 
 199. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 200. Id. at 26–33. 
 201. Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries, the Court 
waxed eloquently regarding “the necessary existence” of the states, Lane Cnty. v. 
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868), preserving the states’ “separate and 
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occasions, however, the Court has treated the Tenth 
Amendment as a substantive constraint on Congress’s 
legislative powers. It is worth analyzing those decisions. 
The first case was New York v. United States. It held 
unconstitutional a provision in the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that directed the state 
legislative or executive branch to assume title to radioactive 
waste or dispose of it as directed by the federal 
 
independent autonomy,” Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868), and protecting 
the states’ “indispensable” powers and “essential function[s],” Lane Cnty., 74 U.S. 
at 76; see also Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (ruling that Congress 
cannot prohibit a state from moving the location of its capital as a condition of 
approving its entry into the union); id. at 565 (“The power to locate its own seat 
of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place 
to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are 
essentially and peculiarly state powers. That one of the original thirteen States 
could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a 
moment entertained.”). Beginning in the 1930s, however, the states and the 
Tenth Amendment waned in importance. The amendment reached its nadir in 
1941 in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In the course of upholding 
the constitutionality of a federal minimum wage law over a Tenth Amendment 
challenge, the Court gave the back of the hand to the notion that the amendment 
played any role in constitutional law. “The amendment states but a truism,” the 
Court wrote, “that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” Id. at 124. 
The amendment appeared to stage a comeback in 1976 when, in National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court held unconstitutional a federal 
law extending minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all state 
and local employees. The Court reasoned that states enjoy certain “attribute[s] of 
sovereignty” that Congress cannot shear away and are constitutionally entitled 
to independence from congressional directives regarding any “functions essential 
to [their] separate and independent existence.” Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle, 221 U.S. 
at 580). That resurgence was short-lived, however, because only nine years later 
the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Since the Garcia case, the 
Court has principally used the Tenth Amendment (and its sibling, the Eleventh 
Amendment) as a rule of construction, demanding that Congress legislate with 
specificity before the Court will conclude that an act of Congress applies to the 
states or their operations. In numerous cases raising Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendment issues, the Court has adopted a “plain statement” rule, requiring 
Congress to specify clearly if a statute applies to the states. See, e.g., Sheriff v. 
Gillie, 136 S. Ct. 1594, 1602 (2016); Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 
125, 140–41 (2004); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73–74 (2000); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1991); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 
223, 228, (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).  
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government.202 The Court reasoned that the Tenth 
Amendment prohibits Congress from treating states like 
federal administrative agencies.203 In Printz v. United States, 
the Court held unconstitutional a provision in the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act directing state and local 
law enforcement officers to implement the act’s background 
check provisions.204 That directive, the Court found, was 
tantamount to the impermissible “conscripting” or 
“commandeering” of state officers.205 Finally, in Murphy v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association the Court concluded 
that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act206 
unconstitutionally prohibited the states from revising their 
own laws outlawing sports gambling.207 Those three cases 
have given rise to the so-called Anticommandeering 
Doctrine, which would serve as the basis of a state Tenth 
Amendment challenge to imposition of state retail-
ownership and advertising-ban requirements as a condition 
of modifying the CSA.208 
Yet, even when Congress cannot invoke the Commerce 
Clause to order the states to undertake certain obligations—
such as setting a minimum driving age or defining a 
particular blood-alcohol content to establish impairment as 
a matter of law—Congress instead can rely on its 
appropriations authority under the Spending Clause to 
persuade the states to join in a cooperative federal-state 
program by offering them something in return for their 
participation. Congress has the Article I authority to raise 
 
 202. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1985). 
 203. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-69, 174–83 (1992). 
 204. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). 
 205. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); see also id. at 904–35. 
 206. Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4228 (1992). 
 207. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018). 
 208. I have argued elsewhere that the Anticommandeering Doctrine is ill-
conceived.  See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10. For present purposes, 
that argument is immaterial. 
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taxes and spend federal funds,209 and it can use that power 
to underwrite collaborative programs.210 Historically, those 
programs have involved an exchange of federal funds for the 
states’ willingness to undertake some particular regulatory 
task, such as administering a state-managed health care 
system for the elderly or poor. A state will receive the funds 
only if it agrees to perform whatever tasks Congress would 
like to see implemented. The Supreme Court has placed only 
a limited number of requirements on Congress’s ability to 
place conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Any 
conditions must be for the purpose of improving the general 
welfare, they must be clear and unambiguous, they must be 
reasonably related to the purpose of the federal expenditure, 
they must be otherwise constitutional, and they cannot 
retroactively nullify already earned benefits.211 Call that 
doctrine “cooperative federalism,” “bribery,” the “Golden 
Rule” (viz., whoever has the gold makes the rules), or 
something else, well-settled Supreme Court case law 
recognizes that Congress may buy cooperation from a state 
when it cannot demand it.  
That rationale applies here. Lifting the CSA ban on 
cannabis trafficking benefits the state—and its residents and 
businesses—in several ways. Once the sale of marijuana is 
no longer a felony under federal law, ganjapreneurs may use 
the federally regulated banking and financial systems to 
make deposits and credit card sales, as well as to raise 
 
 209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the 
United States . . . .”). 
 210. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012); 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (“The Constitution empowers 
Congress to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.’ 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad 
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys . . . .’” (quoting Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.))). 
 211. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 579–85; New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 171–72 (1992); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
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capital for start-up companies or expansion of ones already 
in business. The risk of robbery and burglary of individuals 
and companies will drop off because they will be able to offer 
credit card purchases. Companies can also take advantage of 
the interstate transportation systems to expand their 
markets beyond their states of origin. Some individuals who 
are fearful of breaking the law as long as the CSA is in effect 
might be willing to purchase cannabis. And as business 
improves for all or some of those reasons, states might take 
in greater tax receipts. 
To be sure, that exchange is not identical to the ones that 
the Supreme Court approved in cases like South Dakota v. 
Dole, where Congress conditioned a percentage of federal 
highway funds otherwise allocable to the states on their 
adoption of 21 as the minimum drinking age. Here, the states 
would not receive federal funds, and the states would not 
have a guarantee of receiving additional tax revenues for 
agreeing to follow Congress’s wishes. Nonetheless, 
Congress’s decision to exempt a state from the CSA is a 
legitimate type of “consideration” for contract purposes, and 
that should be sufficient here.212  
Contract law has traditionally required some form of 
consideration for an agreement to bind the parties.213 
Congress’s revision of the CSA is ample in form and amount. 
As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes clear, 
“Consideration may consist of performance or of a return 
promise,” “performance may be a specified act of forbearance 
 
 212. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 577–77 (“We have 
repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as much in the nature 
of a contract.”) (emphasis and internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Barnes v. 
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002))); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“(1) Except 
as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which 
there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration. 
(2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract may be formed under special 
rules applicable to formal contracts or under the rules stated in §§ 82-94.”).  
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. . . or such conduct as will produce a specified result,”214 and 
(with certain exceptions) “any performance which is 
bargained for is consideration.”215 Like all voluntary 
exchanges, the offer described above leaves each party free 
to decide whether it is better off by accepting the deal or 
standing pat. Because Congress is under no obligation to 
modify the CSA to allow medical or recreational marijuana 
programs to exist, its decision to exempt a state from the CSA 
is a legitimate benefit, not “a pretense of [a] bargain.”216 A 
state is free to decline the offer because Congress would not 
be making it an offer it can’t refuse.217 Moreover, state 
residents who work in the cannabis industry or who consume 
its products benefit, and their benefit redounds to the state 
where they reside, pay taxes, or contribute to the local 
economy. It is, as they say, a “fair deal.” The Tenth 
Amendment requires no more than that.218 
In fact, the “pioneering case” establishing the 
Anticommandeering Doctrine,219 New York v. United States, 
approved Congress’s use of nonfinancial incentives to obtain 
state cooperation. To ensure the proper disposal of the 
accumulating amount of radioactive waste generated within 
 
 214. Id. § 71 cmt. d. 
 215. Id. § 72; see id. § 75 (“Except as stated in §§ 76 and 77, a promise which is 
bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised performance would be 
consideration.”). 
 216. Id. § 73.  
 217. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 581 (“In this case, the financial 
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”). 
 218. See id. at 578 (“‘[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to 
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.’ Spending Clause 
programs do not pose this danger when a State has a legitimate choice whether 
to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situation, 
state officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choosing to accept or 
refuse the federal offer.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992))). 
 219. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). 
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the states, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The act represented 
a “compromise” between the three states with operating 
radioactive waste disposal facilities (Nevada, South 
Carolina, and Washington) and the 47 others. At the center 
of the “intricate” mechanics of the law was the hope that 
states would enter into regional compacts to ensure the safe 
disposal of waste generated within their borders.220 To nudge 
the states toward that goal, the act created three 
“incentives.”221 The first incentive was financial. On a certain 
date, the three states with operating disposal facilities could 
impose surcharges on radioactive waste arriving from any 
state not a party to a local waste disposal compact.222 The 
second incentive was non-financial. States that failed to meet 
a deadline to join a regional disposal compact, or to establish 
its intent to develop an in-state disposal facility, could be 
denied access to out-of-state disposal facilities.223 The final 
incentive was that in name only. It provided that a state 
must “take possession” of any waste that a state could not 
adequately dispose of by a date fixed by the act.224  
The Supreme Court held that the first two incentives 
were constitutional.225 The financial incentive was a 
straightforward exercise of Congress’s regulatory authority 
under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. Congress could 
itself impose the surcharges, Congress can allow individual 
 
 220. New York, 505 U.S. at 152–54 
 221. Id. at 152. 
 222. Id. at 152–53, 171 (“The first set of incentives works in three steps. First, 
Congress has authorized States with disposal sites to impose a surcharge on 
radioactive waste received from other States. Second, the Secretary of Energy 
collects a portion of this surcharge and places the money in an escrow account. 
Third, States achieving a series of milestones receive portions of this fund.”).  
 223. Id. at 153, 173 (“In the second set of incentives, Congress has authorized 
States and regional compacts with disposal sites gradually to increase the cost of 
access to the sites, and then to deny access altogether, to radioactive waste 
generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines.”). 
 224. Id. at 153–54. 
 225. Id. at 171–86. 
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states to burden interstate commerce by imposing a 
surcharge on waste generated in another state, and Congress 
can require states to achieve certain milestones to avoid 
paying those surcharges.226 Like the first incentive, the 
second one was also lawful. Here, too, Congress can permit a 
state to discriminate against interstate commerce by 
refusing to dispose of waste generated elsewhere.227 
Moreover, the consequence for a state of failing to achieve 
Congress’s designated milestone fell on the party who 
generated the waste, not the receiving state.228 Only the 
third “incentive”—the so-called “take title” requirement—
was unconstitutional.229 As the Court saw it, a requirement 
that a state take possession of hazardous waste generated 
within its borders “crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion.”230 
The ownership and no-advertising requirements should 
be permissible under New York v. United States. Unlike the 
third “choice” given to the states in that case, Congress 
clearly has the power to demand that states accept the status 
quo in which federal law prohibits any and all marijuana 
 
 226. Id. at 171–73. 
 227. Id. at 173–74. 
 228. Id. at 174 (“This is the choice presented to nonsited States by the Act’s 
second set of incentives: States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive 
waste according to federal standards by attaining local or regional self-
sufficiency, or their residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to 
federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their 
disposal sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, 
because any burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on those who 
generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a 
sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act’s milestones 
may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more 
worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with 
Congress. The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal 
program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or participation as 
worthwhile. Nor must the State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal 
direction; the State may continue to regulate the generation and disposal of 
radioactive waste in any manner its citizens see fit.” (citation omitted)).  
 229. Id. at 174–77. 
 230. Id. at 175. 
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distribution.231 Lifting the ban in states that agree to the 
ownership and advertising conditions is a permissible option 
because Congress can sacrifice uniformity in the application 
of federal law if it has a legitimate reason for doing so.232 
Reducing the risk of marijuana dependency and lowering 
roadway mortality unquestionably are legitimate goals. The 
conditions also rationally strive toward their achievement. 
Congress could believe that state officials will have a greater 
incentive than private retailers to ensure that minors do not 
purchase cannabis, and the advertising ban imposes a 
limited restraint233 that does not threaten free speech 
 
 231. Id. at 175–76 (“The take title provision offers state governments a ‘choice’ 
of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions 
of Congress. Respondents do not claim that the Constitution would authorize 
Congress to impose either option as a freestanding requirement. On one hand, 
the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste 
from generators to state governments. Such a forced transfer, standing alone, 
would in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from 
state governments to radioactive waste producers. The same is true of the 
provision requiring the States to become liable for the generators’ damages. 
Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable from an Act of 
Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state residents. 
Either type of federal action would ‘commandeer’ state governments into the 
service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state 
governments. On the other hand, the second alternative held out to state 
governments—regulating pursuant to Congress’ direction—would, standing 
alone, present a simple command to state governments to implement legislation 
enacted by Congress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower 
Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction.”). 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (holding 
Congress can prohibit broadcast lottery advertising in states that forbid lotteries 
and allow advertising in states where lotteries are lawful); New York, 505 U.S. at 
171–73 (holding Congress can allow states to impose a surcharge on hazardous 
waste generated out of state, or refuse to accept it altogether, as part of a plan to 
encourage each state to develop waste storage facilities); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. 
v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174–78 (1985) (holding Congress can condition 
interstate bank acquisitions); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422–
27 (1946) (holding Congress may authorize a state to pass legislation that would 
otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 233. Several apps—such as Leafly, MassRoots, Weedmaps, and Eaze—enable 
prospective consumers to find potential sellers. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 
112–15. Whether a state or Congress could prohibit private parties from 
advertising the availability, price, and quality of cannabis is beyond the scope of 
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interests because states do not have First Amendment 
rights.234 In addition, here as in New York v. United States, 
the harm from the state’s rejection of the conditions falls on 
the cannabis industry, not the state, because companies miss 
out on the financial and commercial benefits from a truly 
legal business, not just a quasi-legal one.235  
To be sure, there are strings attached to the choice 
Congress would encourage the states to pick. Congress also 
might not be able to put the states to accept conditions like 
these two in other circumstances, such as where Congress 
has not outlawed the product in question and could not do so. 
But Congress can and has outlawed cannabis distribution 
under the CSA for 50 years, so the choice offered to the states 
hardly presents them with an unforeseeable decision. Unlike 
the “choice” put to the states in New York v. United States, 
Congress is still giving the states an honest alternative.236 
That should be sufficient to defeat any Tenth Amendment 
challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Like alcohol and tobacco, marijuana is a consumer good 
that can harm individual users and third parties. Most states 
with medical or recreational cannabis programs permit 
private businesses to own the means of production and sale, 
and the states regulate those operations. But traditional 
 
this Article. 
 234. See supra note 177. 
 235. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174. 
 236. See id. at 176–77 (“Respondents emphasize the latitude given to the 
States to implement Congress’ plan. The Act enables the States to regulate 
pursuant to Congress’ instructions in any number of different ways. States may 
avoid taking title by contracting with sited regional compacts, by building a 
disposal site alone or as part of a compact, or by permitting private parties to 
build a disposal site. States that host sites may employ a wide range of designs 
and disposal methods, subject only to broad federal regulatory limits. This line of 
reasoning, however, only underscores the critical alternative a State lacks: A 
State may not decline to administer the federal program. No matter which path 
the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.”). 
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regulatory tools such as licensing, product quality testing, 
and taxation do not address the harms caused to users by 
cannabis dependency and to third parties by marijuana-
impaired drivers. Additional supply-side approaches are also 
necessary. States should assume responsibility for the retail 
sale of cannabis, just as many already do in the case of 
alcohol. States should also decline to advertise their own 
cannabis sales. Finally, as an exercise in cooperative 
federalism, Congress should offer to lift the federal ban on 
marijuana sales if states assume those responsibilities. Some 
states do that now in the case of alcohol. The states and 
Congress should use the same approach for cannabis. 
